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A
Q^.JqT)-' ^7 FOREWORD
The Institute of Government and Public Affairs sponsored in January
the Assembly on Illinois Local Government, a forum in which the problems
of local government in Illinois were discussed. Local government, for the
purposes of this Assembly, was defined as all legally constituted public bodies
below the state level which have taxing power, bonding power, formal
coercive authority, or any combination of the three. Throughout the papers
in this volume and in the Assembly discussions, the emphasis was on services
provided by local governments and on their place in the entire governmental
framework, rather than on local government finance.
Participating in the Assembly were some forty Illinois leaders knowledge-
able in the field of local government. A complete list of participants is
included at the end of this volume. The participants were divided into
three round-table sections to discuss problems of local government; after the
round-table discussions, a final general session was held in which the final
report, or findings, of the Assembly was drafted. This was the third As-
sembly sponsored by the Institute of Government; the two previous were
concerned with Illinois state government and Illinois political parties. In
this volume are presented the findings of the Assembly on Illinois Local
Government and the background papers used as a basis for the discussions
in which the findings were developed.
Assisting in the planning of the Assembly was an advisory committee
consisting of Meade Baltz, then chairman of the Will County Board of
Supervisors and now a member of the Illinois House of Representatives;
Dan G. Brown, county clerk of Warren County; A. L. Sargent, executive
director of the Illinois Municipal League; Raymond F. Simon, assistant to
the Mayor of Chicago; and Professor Samuel K. Gove, Institute of Govern-
ment and Public Affairs, who served as Assembly chairman. The assistance
of these people has been greatly appreciated, as has that of the authors of
the background papers, who are identified in the list of authors near the end
of this volume.
Credit for channeling the discussions and bringing out the Assembly
findings must go to the chairmen of the three panels— Meade Baltz; Jack
M. Siegel of Ancel, Siegel, and Stonesifer, municipal attorneys; and Maurice
W. Scott, executive secretary of the Taxpayers' Federation of Illinois.
Gilbert Y. Steiner
Director, Institute of
Government and Public Affairs

CONTENTS
FOREWORD Ill
INTRODUCTION 1
FINAL REPORT OF ASSEMBLY ON ILLINOIS LOCAL GOVERNMENT 9
BACKGROUND PAPERS 13
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONCEPT
Gilbert Y. Steiner 15
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
Daniel J. Elazar 24
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL POLITICS
Samuel K. Gove 36
LEGAL STATUS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
I. An Outline of Legal Relationships 49
George M. Piatt
II. The Home Rule Experience 54
Illinois Municipal League Committee on Home Rule
MUNICIPAL SERVICES IN ILLINOIS
Charles M. Kneier 60
COUNTY AND TOV/NSHIP FUNCTIONS IN ILLINOIS
Irving Howards 73
APPENDIX 83
LIST OF AUTHORS 89
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AND STAFF 89

INTRODUCTION
Most Illinois citizens live under three levels of general purpose local
government— county, township, and municipal— and under several special
purpose governments, including the many school districts. Citizens partici-
pate in these various governments as taxpayers and as voters, by electing
local government officials. A tabular summary of the kinds and numbers of
local governments in Illinois is provided in the Appendix.
The largest unit of local government in terms of area covered is the
county. Illinois is divided into 102 counties, the borders of which have not
changed for a century. Eighty-five of the state's counties are subdivided
into 1,433 civil townships. Most counties have between ten and twenty
townships, although small Putnam County has only four, while La Salle
County has thirty-seven.
There are 1,181 municipalities in Illinois; the number increased by
twenty-four from 1952 to 1957. There are 102 municipalities in Cook
County, and in downstate counties the number of municipalities ranges
from three in several counties to twenty-seven in St. Clair County. Munici-
palities in Illinois are of three types— cities, villages, and incorporated
towns. The larger municipalities are usually cities, the smaller ones are
villages, and the few incorporated towns are places granted special charters
before the adoption of the Constitution of 1870.
Over half of the population of Illinois is found in Cook County (1960
population 5,086,924), and most of these people reside in Chicago (1960
population 3,516,258). There are few other large counties and cities in the
state; most of the townships, municipalities, and counties are quite small.
Table 1 shows the number of local units by population.
Illinois municipalities generally have little formal relationship with the
county or town governments, and the different levels operate independently
of each other. The separation is further marked by local custom; for ex-
ample, a county sheriff will seldom investigate crime in a city with an
organized police department, although he has the legal power to do so.
Township and county governments have a closer relationship, although in
many ways they too operate as separate units. Township supervisors not
only make township decisions when acting in their township capacity, but
also sit on the county board and thereby make decisions affecting the county
as a whole. However, separation of local governments is the rule, and this
TABLE 1. NUMBER AND POPULATION OF ILLINOIS GENERAL PURPOSE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS"
council, or managerial optional forms of government. A county has two
optional governmental forms, either the township or the commission form.
Many local government functions have been removed from the control
of the elective officials of the general purpose governments, and county,
township, and municipal governments are only a part of the total local
government structure. A multiplicity of special districts, most of them
established for a single function, exists in Illinois. In 1957 there were 3,793
special districts, of which 1,993 were school districts. There are several
reasons for the establishment of these special districts; in some instances,
they have been created to circumvent tax-rate and bonded-indebtedness
limitations; in others, to serve an area not coterminous with any other
existing local government; and in the case of schools, at least, to take
government out of "politics."
Most of the special purpose governments are school districts, although
there has been a sharp decrease in the number of these districts in recent
years. Through a state program to encourage— and even to force— con-
solidations, the number of districts was reduced 43 per cent in the five-year
period 1952-1957. In a few instances, school districts operate under special
charters providing for an appointive school board, but generally citizens
throughout the state choose the members of the boards by election.
The 1,800 non-school special purpose governments are involved in many
functions, ranging from mosquito abatement to airport maintenance. Most
(880) are concerned with natural resources; this number includes 723
drainage districts, which are special assessment units without tax levying
powers. Other sizeable numbers of special purpose districts are involved in
fire protection, parks and recreation, housing, sanitation, hospitals, airports,
health, and urban water supply. Only a few special purpose districts are
governed by elective boards; these include some drainage districts; some
park districts; soil conservation districts; some tuberculosis sanitarium dis-
tricts; wildlife districts; and the Chicago Sanitary District, the Prairie
DuPont and the East Side Levee and Sanitary Districts, whose trustees are
elected as partisans in general elections.
Summary of the Papers
To aid Assembly participants in the discussion of problems of local
government, sLx background papers were prepared. Each of these papers
was intended to point up possible topics for discussion in one area of local
government; none was intended to be an inclusive treatment of a particular
set of problems. An important aspect of local government deliberately
omitted from the discussions was local government finance; the emphasis,
rather, was upon the services local governments perform. The background
papers ranged from a general, theoretical treatment of the local government
concept to a specific discussion of municipal, county, and township services.
The general, theoretical approach to local government was taken by
Mr. Steiner, who pointed out six critical roles of local government. A local
government provides routine goods and services; regulations, as distinct
from services, to maximize economic and social stability; protection for
those who are clearly at a disadvantage as a result of physical, emotional,
or economic circumstances; convenient machinery for carrying out programs
on which there is state or national consensus; opportunity for a maximum
number of people to work at democracy; and relatively stable employment
under desirable working conditions for part of the local labor force.
Mr. Elazar considered the relationships between local government and
federal, state, and other local governments, defining at some length the
kinds of intergovernmental relationships that now exist. He questioned not
whether intergovernmental relations should exist, but rather, how interac-
tion can be made as effective as possible to provide necessary and desirable
services and, at the same time, to strengthen political institutions we deem
valuable.
In his discussion of local government and local politics, Mr. Gove posed
the question of whether local government should actually be considered as
a partisan political activity— that is, as part of the state's political structure.
He pointed out what local government posts are elective, when elections are
held, and how much competition for local offices exists. He discussed at
some length the frequency of partisan and nonpartisan elections on the
local level, and reviewed the arguments that have been made for both
positions.
The discussion of the legal status of local government was presented in
two sections. First, Mr. Piatt discussed the existing legal status of Illinois
local governments, reviewing the effects of the constitution on local govern-
mental units and the statutes creating them. Then, because of the frequency
with which home rule has been suggested as a possible alternative to the
present legal status of Illinois municipalities, a discussion of municipal
home rule in Illinois and other states was presented. This discussion, taken
from a report by the Illinois Municipal League Committee on Home Rule,
focused on home rule in the broader sense (i.e., actual municipal autonomy
as opposed to constitutional home rule) and questioned whether constitu-
tional home rule would provide more freedom for Illinois cities than they
presently have.
In his discussion of municipal services in Illinois, Mr. Kneier identified
three types of services: those about which there is general agreement that
they should be performed by city governments; those about which there is
no general agreement, but which are usually provided by the city; and those
which are unusual in that they are found in only a few cities. Examples
of all three types were touched on in the paper, with particular emphasis
on the services about which there are poUcy questions (i.e., questions on how
they should be performed or, in some cases, on whether they should be
performed at all) .
Mr. Howards, in his paper on county and township functions in Illinois,
discussed the services and regulatory activities of these governments and
the governmental structure through which they must operate to perform,
first, their functions as agents of the state, and second, their municipal-type
functions in providing services to their own residents.
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FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY
ON ILLINOIS LOCAL GOVERNMENT'
Agreeing that viable and responsible local government is crit-
ical to American democratic life, the participants in the As-
sembly on Illinois Local Government, meeting at Robert Allerton
Park, Monticello, Illinois, January 18-20, 1961, approved this
summary of their findings at the conclusion of their discussions.
Since there were dissents on particular points, it should not be
assumed that every participant subscribed to every detail of the
statements contained herein.
Reorganization, consolidation, and reduction of overlapping
jurisdictions of local governments are needed in order that a
clearer line of responsibility between the voter and local govern-
ment may be drawn.
The county has not been utilized as much as it can be in pro-
viding appropriate services; its functions should be expanded
under modernized patterns.
Redistricting of townships is desirable where needed to pro-
vide them with adequate resources to carry out their functions.
The organization of city or village governments with tax bases
inadequate to provide ordinary municipal services should be
prohibited. Provision should be made for consolidation of county
functions where individual counties are unable to provide needed
services.
^ In order to use the time most effectively, the Assembly excluded questions of
local government finance from its discussion.
II
The Municipal Problems Commission and the County Prob-
lems Commission" should place on their agenda consideration of
the appointment of certain presently elected officials whose func-
tions are purely administrative.
Ill
Organized partisanship is desirable at the local level to stimu-
late and maintain popular participation. National party labels
are not always necessary; local party labels can also serve the
purpose of providing competition between two identifiable
groups.
Permanent organization of local parties should be facilitated.
While it is recognized that the maintenance of permanent
local organization may require systems of political patronage,
there is a need for the continued upgrading of governmental
personnel.
IV
While a separate state department of local government is not
called for, the executive branch of the state government should
concern itself with providing advice to and information for local
officials, especially those newly elected. The ongoing work of
the Municipal Problems Commission and the County Problems
Commission should be encouraged as a means of liaison between
the local governments and the legislative and executive branches
of the state government.
There should be continued study of the value of a national
department of urban affairs.
There is a need for more cooperation between governmental
units at various levels. Municipal governments should take ad-
" These are permanent legislative commissions, established in 1957, officially
named the Cities and Villages Municipal Problems Commission and the Commission
on County Problems.
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vantage of present statutory authorization for such cooperation,
and the statutes should be expanded to authorize intercounty
and municipal-county cooperation.
VI
Services are the primary responsibility of local governments,
but the provision of particular municipal-type services should be
locally determined. The extent and kinds of public services will
vary from area to area. Proprietary services that can effectively
and economically be performed by private enterprise should be
left to private enterprise. Those services that are affected with a
vital public interest should be furnished by the local government.
Ascribing particular services to particular local governmental
units must be done on the basis not only of efficiency in provid-
ing the service, but of opportunity for maximum participation
in local government as well.
VII
The General Assembly should study the possibility of statu-
tory or constitutional home rule for municipalities and counties.
VIII
Although the Assembly did not concern itself with the prob-
lem of finances, it is evident that study should be given to a
revision of the tax system in order that the necessary revenue
can be provided for expanded local governmental services.
n

BACKGROUND PAPERS

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONCEPT
GILBERT Y. STEINER
Let US begin by assuming that the participants in the Assembly on
Illinois Local Government could create a local government enterprise which
would discharge all general functions that any participant or group of
participants deemed essential but which would not carry on general activities
that a clear majority of the participants would find improper or offensive.
Because the participants have been chosen with a view to representing a
wide variety of interests, it may follow from the initial assumption that
the local government enterprise so created would tend to be favorably
received by many groups and individuals with a direct concern in local
government whether from the point of view of the producer (the local
government official), the consumer (the taxpayer), or the regulatory agency
(state oflScials) . Thus, the enterprise under discussion would be a kind of
model local government in the sense that it would represent an ideal with
which existing endeavors could be compared. The model should be espe-
cially illuminating in showing the different uses to which local government
is put by the groups that sustain it and are sustained by it.
Undoubtedly, the very first objection that would be raised to creating
this model enterprise would be that it should not be a single enterprise at
all. It would be alleged that a clear majority of the participants would find
it offensive and improper for a single local government enterprise to be
concerned simultaneously with traffic regulation and elementary and sec-
ondary education, or indeed, with education and anything else. It would
be further alleged that both education and traffic control are, however,
essential. I would be quite willing to let these objections be made. In terms
of services, it does not matter whether the local government enterprise we
are creating is a diversified enterprise with a multiplicity of service respon-
sibilities or a restricted enterprise assigned a single service function.
I do not consider it useful to think of local government as simply a
collection of services bound together by the tax rate. Furnishing goods and
services for the people within a described geographic area is obviously a
major local government function. However, the Northern Illinois Water
Corporation, the Catholic Church, the Illinois Power Company, innumerable
sanitary haulers, and sundry private sanitary treatment plants have demon-
strated that there are a good many local government services that can be
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performed by nongovernmental agencies. Whether or not a given unit of
local government operates a municipal electric utility is hardly a test of
the effectiveness of the unit. I believe the argument can be extended to
suggest that the number of services offered by a local government is not of
itself a test of the viability of that government. Chicago would be no greater
a city if the Chicago Park District were abolished tomorrow and its func-
tions absorbed by the city; nor would Urbana be any more or less attractive
if municipal garbage collection were to replace the present system of com-
peting private scavengers.
If the number of services offered is not the most important element in
local government, what is? What kinds of things are done by local govern-
ments of all kinds that make it possible to argue that a school district or a
sanitary district under the proper circumstances may come as close to model
local government status as do urban counties or cities? I submit that there
are at least half a dozen critical local government activities the presence or
absence of each of which is of more significance than the addition or dele-
tion of most single services.
Critical Roles of Local Government
In order to meet the reasonable needs of all those it serves, local govern-
ment will provide some of each of the following:
1. Routine goods and services to taxpayers and, under appropriate
conditions, to non-taxpayers. Although considerable attention has just gone
into suggesting that the service role is not the be-all and end-all of local
government, neither should it be assumed that this role is nonexistent.
Clearly, without some service role, a local government loses a critical justi-
fication for its legal existence. Later in this volume, the reader will find a
special discussion of the range of services provided by Illinois cities and
villages and a parallel discussion of Illinois county (and township) services.
These papers succeed in showing both the great range of services presently
provided and some of the gaps in services when Illinois local governments
are compared with those in some other jurisdictions. If we have established
anything, it is that there is no fixed number of services that justifies a local
government, but that without purveying at least a single major service, local
government would have no justification for public status. It does not seem
necessary to labor the point that service is a local government function.
2. Regulations, as distinct from services, to maximize economic and
social stability. This kind of activity is different both from routine services
like police and fire protection, and from local government action in the
\velfare fields that is typified by human relations councils and programs for
the aged. The present reference, rather, is to the range of activity that can
be undertaken only by government because it alone has coercive authority.
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Many of the activities I would classify in this group are subsumed under
the police power— the power of a municipality to protect the health,
welfare, and morals of its citizens. In addition, they include zoning and
subdivision control as a minimum. The very fact that local government can
impose such regulations is sometimes a matter of crucial importance whether
they are actually imposed or not.
Regulations of the character I am concerned with here are made by
whatever local government can be effective. Thus, all students of local
government are aware of the battles over annexation that really turn on
whether or not a given territory will become subject to a muncipal zoning
ordinance. Water supply may be a routine service, but the injection of
fluoride into the system is a governmental action beyond the service level
and in the regulatory role. Licensing of trailer camps and insuring that
they meet public health requirements are likely county regulatory activities.
Local governments that concern themselves with the force and authority
that the word
"government" connotes not only provide service, but do not
hesitate to impose regulations.
3. Protection for those members of the local society who are clearly at
a disadvantage as a result of physical, emotional, or economic circumstances.
It is unnecessary to get caught up in the merits of the welfare state to accept
as fact the role of government in providing emergency financial aid to the
destitute, therapy to the mentally disturbed, and whatever conveniences are
feasible for the very old and the very young. To this can probably be added
agreement on the role of government in protecting its minority group citi-
zens from gross discrimination and in providing special facilities for young
people whose moral and ethical standards have not been fixed. In action
terms, these take the form of bureaus of public aid and of welfare, of mental
health clinics, of senior citizens and infant day care centers, of human
relations councils, and of youth bureaus. In many instances, some or all of
these programs become local only in the sense that they are administered
by a local agency on behalf of state or national government. The range of
discretion permitted the local unit varies with the degree to which these
other governments have involved themselves, but it is probably true that in
virtually no case is there state or national preemption of any of these
activities.
The responsibility for discharging this kind of social role tends to be
felt most clearly, at the local government level, by city and village govern-
ments and by counties with important urban centers. Moreover, the dra-
matic developments in urbanization of America have tended to direct
attention to this role even in those places where this kind of social action by
government has not been part of the tradition. Thus, there are now thirteen
official municipal human relations commissions in the state of Illinois. Such
17
different communities as New York City and Decatur, Illinois, have simul-
taneously determined to take official action to ameliorate the lot of the
older citizen. Social problems attendant upon urbanization and some ways
in which local government can act on them have been made a matter of
official record by the legislative group studying Chicago metropolitan affairs.
No local government of any kind can be indifferent to the suffering of
those within its boundaries who suffer through no fault of their own. The
fact that suffering can take place in something other than a physical sense
has only recently become widely understood. As it becomes more generally
understood, an increase in the ways in which local governments of all kinds
act in the broad field of social relations is inevitable. A park district has
not performed an effective local government job if it maintains acres of
natural splendor which are used as racial battlefields. The likelihood seems
very great that those kinds of local governments presumed to have a single
function will branch out. School districts plainly are alert to juvenile
mental health counselling, and park and forest preserve districts to human
relations programs, especially in race relations.
4. Convenient machinery for carrying out programs on which there is
state or national consensus. The Local Government Advisory Committee
Report to the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations listed twenty-
three activities of federal-local contact "due primarily to the National Gov-
ernment's interest." Obviously, the points of state-local contact would be
many times that number. Local government is low man on the totem pole
as far as discretionaiy authority is concerned, and it is evident that local
government can not prevail in a real conflict over local administration of
state or national policy. Conflict, however, is the dramatic but not the
common kind of interaction between local and central governments. Local
government is authorized by the central unit to do a job that the central
unit can not or wdll not or should not do itself. This wall usually mean a
willingness on the part of central government to aid local government and
will frequently mean a sharing of whatever burden is involved.
It would be tedious to recite the kinds of programs in which local
government serves as an administrative agency for state or national govern-
ment. Indeed, the Workshop in American Federalism at the University of
Chicago is busy demonstrating that there is no sphere of local government
activity that is not intergovernmental in practice. This point is developed
in a later paper in this volume. It is important to note here that variations
in wealth, in tradition, in climate, in geography, and in sundry other cir-
cumstances make it desirable for the niceties of policy to be adjusted to fit
geographic and population areas smaller than a state. In some cases, this
is achieved by the use of regional or local administrative offices of central
government. In other cases, it is more appropriate to put policy discretion
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in local hands, the situation typified by the relationship between the state,
its superintendent of public instruction, and the local school boards.
Whether local government is simply a convenient mechanism for carry-
ing out a fixed policy, or whether it acts only to delay or hasten the appli-
cation of central government policy, or whether it has a role in fixing policy
limits, its function as an administrative arm of central government is an
indispensable one.
5. Opportunity for a maximum number of people to work at dem.ocracy.
If all local government in America were suddenly abolished, the range of
public decisions over which private citizens could exercise maximum control
would be materially diminished in number if not in importance. Mani-
festly, no decisions that can be made at the local level can compete in
importance with the decisions that must now be made in matters of national
security and national economic policy. For sundiy reasons, these major
decisions affecting national survival are largely beyond popular control.
Our democratic institutions, however, thrive on popular participation in
the business of government. Perhaps the only area in which those decisions
are straightforward enough to permit direct citizen participation is in the
local government field. This is one of the reasons that citizens' education
councils, mayors' committees on housing, and advisory boards to forest
preserve districts are multiplying. It is also one of the reasons for the
persistence of what seems to be a ridiculously large number of local units
of government. Eveiy one of Illinois' 6,500 plus local governments is an
exercise in popular participation in public business. For this purpose, it
may not matter much whether the governing authorities are elected officials
or are themselves appointed by an elected official. Appointments to policy-
making posts in local government frequently are based on group represen-
tation, allotting one seat to a labor spokesman, one to a business spokesman,
one to a spokesman for minorities, and so on. The result is to afford the
groups so represented a relatively easy access to public decision-making, and
thus to stimulate their interest in public affairs.
There is simply no \vay to maximize citizen participation in government
in a country as large geographically and in numbers of people as the United
States other than through a multiplicity of local governments. As a way of
maintaining interest in democratic institutions, it is quite true that if a
system of local government did not exist, we would have to invent one to
train a citizenry generally untrained in judging public issues. Indeed, it is
this drive to hold onto whatever elements of pure democracy are compatible
with technology that accounts for the continuing strength of the initiative
and referendum. Outrageously complicated questions are submitted to
direct vote of the people, but the system seems to be sufficiently self-adjusting
that no calamity— but sometimes considerable inconvenience— stems from
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weird results. Almost the only kind of modern governmental activity that
can not have calamitous consequences is that carried on at the local level.
The future of civilization will not depend on the failure or success of a
drainage bond issue in Danville, Illinois, but it is a good bet that the subject
provokes more political activity from a greater number of people there than
does unilateral disarmament and an end to nuclear testing.
This kind of political role, then— the business of working at democracy
in order that techniques for judging candidates and issues be sharpened—
is one of the roles of local government. Some organizational forms are better
suited for this role than others. In general, the local government that de-
mands maximum informed citizen participation in those areas where special
technical skill is not a prerequisite to intelligent action is playing the
political role most effectively. This, of course, is what accounts for theo-
retical objections sometimes raised to the manager plan— that it maximizes
efficiency and public reporting, but that it does not act to maximize
participation at the only level where participation is practical.
The political role I have sketched here is different in emphasis from the
political role usually ascribed to local government
— that of a training
ground for personnel who will later move up to state and national office.
Without researching the problem, I have an intuitive conviction that there
is not nearly as much movement of this sort as seemed to be suggested, for
example, by the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations' Advisory
Committee on Local Government, which said, "The counties, cities, towns,
villages, and boroughs serve as training schools for the leaders of govern-
ment, and in the afTairs of local government are tried those who aspire to
State and National office." In fact, the local judiciary spawns no federal
judicial officers; career administrators almost never transfer from local to
state or federal service; and very few governors started in local government
(Calvin Coolidge's rise from councilman to governor to President is prob-
ably no argument for the training ground notion). Although there is some
upward mobility between the state legislatures and Congress, there is prac-
tically no parallel movement between local legislative bodies and either
state or federal legislatures. Indeed, political observers have puzzled for
years over the fact that the important post of Mayor of New York City is
actually a "dead end" job. In recent years, only one mayor of a major
metropolitan center, Senator Joseph Clark of Philadelphia, has made the
jump to national office.
In sum, there is a critical political function for local government to
fulfill. That function is not the training of players before they move to the
big leagues. It is, rather, the sponsorship of sand-lot politics in order that
community interest in the game be maximized, and that the fans be
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enabled to exercise real discrimination when they have a chance from
time to time to watch and to support the professionals.
6. Relatively stable employment under desirable working conditions for
part of the local labor force. Local government, like industry or commerce,
requires the personal services of local residents. In this sense, local govern-
ment has a regular payroll to meet which is used to sustain local families
and the local economy generally. Just as government would look with
jaundiced eye at arbitrary layoffs by private industry, at substandard work-
ing conditions, or the like, so local government must assume some responsi-
bilities in its personnel relationships.
Considering cities and villages alone as a local government class, there
are almost a million and a half employees of these units in the United
States. To take an Illinois city at random, Joliet shows 361 employees, 358
of them full-time, with a monthly payroll just under $134,000. Police and
firemen together account for more than half the total number.
It is not necessary to dig out statistics to show that local government is
an important employer. As an employer, its function is to provide the
best product possible consistent with fair labor standards. The principal
issue in this connection is whether fair standards for a local government
employee differ from those for employees of private enterprise. Some ques-
tions within this area present no problem: pensions, for example, are
equally acceptable to public employers and private. More difficult is the
matter of negotiating on salaries and working conditions. Some public
employees, legally or morally debarred from using the strike weapon, have
taken the salary issue to the political arena and lobbied for state imposed
mimima.
The single most troublesome aspect of local government as an employer
is how it can maintain its quasi-sovereign rights and at the same time pro-
vide a fair and equitable remedy to its employees. That problem exists for
school districts, for cities, for sanitary districts, and for every other local
government.
The Dilemma of Local Government
It is not to be expected that there will be universal agreement with this
formulation of a concept of local government as an agency which serves,
regulates, protects, administers, democratizes, and employs. A good deal
of the objection is likely to center on the equal importance that seems to
be assigned to each of these roles. Many will argue that service is the real
role of local government, and that regulation is a kind of service which
should be provided sparingly; that protection in the sense I have used it
here is not the business of local government at all, but only of voluntary
agencies; that the administrative role as an agency of central government
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is to be deplored and resisted unless maximum freedom is given local units
in the application of the policy; that democratizing is desirable, but inci-
dental to service; and that the bureaucratic role of local government is a
necessary evil which should be minimized, if not eliminated. Variations on
this response will probably upgrade the local government role in perpetuat-
ing democratic institutions.
Nevertheless, local government is one of the great sacred cows of Amer-
ican government and politics. Campaigners for state and national office
invariably feel obliged to assert their belief in the importance of local
government, in the wisdom of local officials, and in the close interconnection
between effective local government and effective democracy. Thus, Charles
Percy, chairman of the 1960 Republican national platform committee, ar-
gued recently that "A partnership of Federal and local government works
best in the Federal system, where authority and political power must rest as
close to home as possible." Similarly, the report of the Kennedy Conference
on Urban Affairs spoke of the merits of local control:
The roots of day-to-day American democracy lie in allegiance to state and
local governments. Mayors, city councilmen, and local officials and citizens have
first-hand knowledge of the needs of their communities. We will continue to look to
these local officials for leadership in planning and carrying out rebuilding and
conservation programs. The initiative and responsibility will properly remain local.
But even while local authority and initiative are blessed, their free
exercise is often damned. This is the kind of dilemma that those concerned
with local government are constantly running into. In the abstract, local
government takes its place with "getting out the vote" as the political
equivalent of motherhood. When a hard look is taken at what the local
government concept may include, however, motherhood seems less lovely.
It is commonplace to hear that local home rule should be maximized, but
local government power should be limited; local government should experi-
ment, but it should conform; it should have responsibility, but its powers
should be circumscribed lest local officials run wild; it should be efficient,
but it should not have a bureaucracy to get things done; it should not be
political, but it should provide experienced people for state and national
political office; it should provide service, but its tax rates should be con-
trolled by referendum.
It is only in a handful of cases that local government practice does not
approach the kind of diversity of functions I have outlined in the previous
section. Narrowly restricted local governments are not flourishing. Taken
all together, the wildlife districts, tuberculosis sanitarium districts, library
districts, river conservancy districts, street light districts, and surface water
protection districts in all of Illinois total less than a dozen. The well-known
progress in the elimination of small, uneconomic school districts in recent
years, both in Illinois and elsewhere, is further evidence of the obsolescence
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of local governments that are too poor, too small, too restricted legally, or
too unimaginative to take maximum advantage of their potential as gov-
ernments. In this sense, the dilemma of local government is being resolved.
The local governments that survive are diversified enterprises that will not
be held to a concept of least government. They will serve, regulate, protect,
administer, democratize, and employ.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE'
DANIEL J. ELAZAR
The American Federal System
Local governments— rural, urban, and suburban— are part and parcel
of the American federal system. As such, they and their services are insep-
arably linked not only with each other, but with the state and federal
governments as well. Frequently a specific local governmental unit has
stronger connections with its state and federal counterparts than with other
adjacent local governments. Even within the same local government, a
local housing authority, for example, will often be in constant contact with
state and federal housing agencies and only in rare instances be in contact
with the parks and recreation department located in the same building.
In Illinois, most municipal departments have little to do with either the
federal government or with their county governments, while the city's special
agencies have usually been created for purposes of intergovernmental coop-
eration and have little contact with the municipal departments.
So intertwined are the activities of the various governments of the
United States that hardly any governmental functions exist that are not, in
some respect, shared by more than one level of government. Using a very
simple analogy, we can describe the formal structure of the American federal
system as a layer cake, with federal, state, and local "layers" connected by
a
"filling" of shared powers. Examination of the actual operation of the
system reveals that, by a similar analogy, it is functionally more like a
marble cake, with individual functions "marbled" throughout and scant
concern for layers.
The example of a county sanitarian in a southwestern state embodies
the whole idea of the marble cake of government. He is appointed by the
state under merit standards established by the federal government. Most
of his salary comes from state and federal funds but is supplemented by
the largest city in the county, which pays him for his services as city plumb-
ing inspector. His office and its equipment are supplied by the county, with
an assist from the city, and part of his expenses is paid from county funds.
His day-to-day operations are equally intermingled. He carries out his
task of inspecting the purity of food under federal standards, although he
' The first part of this paper is based on research done by the author and others
in the Federalism Workshop of the University of Chicago, under the direction of
Professor Morton Grodzins.
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enforces state laws when inspecting commodities that have not been in inter-
state commerce. Somewhat in reverse, he inspects milk coming into the
county from a neighboring state under state authority. He acts as a federal
officer when he impounds impure drugs imported from another state; as a
federal-state officer when he distributes typhoid immunization serum; as a
state officer when he enforces standards of industrial hygiene; as a state-
county officer when he inspects the purity of his city's water supply; and,
completing the circle, as a city officer when he compels the city restaurateurs
to adopt more hygienic methods of handling their garbage. As sanitarian
he is a deputy sheriff and an ex-officio member of the city police force. In
short, he considers all public health and sanitation business in his county to
be his business and does not normally stop, in the course of his work, to
consider which hat he is wearing at any given time.
The governmental system of shared functions which our exemplary
sanitarian serves is not just a product of twentieth-century governmental
expansion. Although its present complexity may be new, the system of col-
laboration is as old as the federal system itself. There has never been a
time when it was possible to attach neat labels to separate "federal," "state,"
and "local" functions. Even before the adoption of the Constitution, the
Northwest Ordinances of 1785 and 1787 made the federal government a
major factor in the creation of the American public education system by
granting lands to the new states for public education. These grants-in-land
involved a continuing process of legislative and administrative cooperation
in what is now considered to be the most local function of all.
By this action, the American people established a first principle of
American federalism: the general government would use its superior ability
to mobilize the nation's financial resources to stimulate and support pro-
grams of nationwide interest. In turn, the programs would be principally
developed and administered by the states and their local subdivisions.
The essential unity of the state and federal fiscal systems was recognized
in the late eighteenth century, with federal assumption of the states' Revo-
lutionary War debts and the creation of a cooperative national banking
system. This same community of interest was applied to the administration
of elections, law enforcement, public health measures, national defense, and
numerous other services at the same time.
Despite widely held beliefs to the contrary, this pattern of intergovern-
mental collaboration continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century.
Studies of political behavior and administrative action provide evidence
that, throughout the entire period of so-called dual federalism, the many
governments in the American federal system continued the close administra-
tive and fiscal collaboration of the earlier period, in a manner comparable
to government today.
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Federal grants-in-land and grants-in-services were of first importance in
virtually every major function undertaken by the states and their local
subdivisions. Then, as today, federal grants stimulated state interest as well
as reenforcing it. Aside from fonnally exclusive federal-state programs,
these grants aided local governments in providing elementary and secondary
schools; in constructing roads, canals, and railroads; in improving rivers and
harbors (which normally involved direct federal-local cooperation) ; in
reclaiming swamp lands; in constructing public buildings; and in creating
welfare programs and institutions. The City of Chicago was founded and
incorporated as part of a major federal-state cooperative program for con-
struction of the Illinois and Michigan Canal.
Collaboration has not extended only from the center outward. Although
the federal government constitutionally possesses exclusive powers in rela-
tions with the Indian tribes, the state and local authorities were continually
(if not always wisely) involved in Indian aflfairs. Even more striking is the
progressive dispersion of power given to the federal government by the
Constitution for control over and improvement of navigable waters. Here
state and local governments became involved in everything from port reg-
ulation, immigration control, and admiralty questions to actual develop-
ment of rivers and harbors in cooperation with the U.S. Corps of Engineers.
The essential continuity of this collaborative system is best demonstrated
by the evolution of grants-in-aid. Land grants came to be reckoned as cash
grants, based on the calculated disposable value of the lands granted. Then,
in 1887, three years before the Census Bureau declared the land frontier to
be closed and the public domain no longer the main source of readily avail-
able national wealth, the Congress enacted the first permanent annual cash
grants (for agricultural experimentation and state soldiers' homes). Thus,
the sheer weight of history has become the foundation for the present system
of shared functions that characterizes federal-state-local relations.
It is a misjudgment of our history and of our present situation to view
the system as one of neat separation of governmental functions, either in the
past or at the present time. Only drastic alterations in our social order and
political system could bring about the neat separation longed for by some.
Evidence of this is readily available in the fate of the four major attempts
to disengage the three governmental levels that have been made in less than
fifteen years: the first (1947-1949) and second (1953-1955) Hoover Com-
missions on Executive Organization; the Kestnbaum Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations (1953-1955); and the Joint Federal-State Action
Committee (1957-1959). Where all four were concerned with the problem
of federalism, they were animated by the same goals: to minimize federal
activities whenever and wherever possible and to separate, wherever possible.
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the functions and tax sources of the federal government from those of the
state and local governments.
The failure of all four groups is a matter of record. The history of the
Joint Federal-State Action Committee is particularly revealing. At the
Williamsburg, Virginia, Governors' Conference, President Eisenhower spoke
out against what he considered to be "excessive concentration of power" in
Washington. At his suggestion a committee composed of high federal and
state officials was formed to "designate functions which the states are ready
and willing to assume and finance that are now financed wholly or in part
by the Federal Government" and simultaneously to indicate "federal and
state revenue adjustments required to enable the states to assume such
functions." The committee was indeed a stellar and seemingly powerful
one, including three members of the President's cabinet, the director of the
Bureau of the Budget, and ten state governors. The President gave them
his full support; the committee undertook its task with diligence; and
excellent staff studies from the best available sources were put at its disposal.
The committee members (with one exception) agreed on its avowed goal
of "decentralization" via separation of functions and revenue sources and
considered theirs to be an action, not a study, group.
The mountain labored for two years and brought forth a mouse. The
committee finally recommended that federal aid for vocational education
and grants for municipal waste treatment plants— programs whose total
cost to the federal government was less than $80 million (or 2 per cent of
the total amount of federal grants-in-aid at the time) — be eliminated. In
order to enable the states to assume the added burdens this transfer would
entail, the committee recommended that a 4 per cent credit against the
federal tax on local telephone service be granted, which would have given
the states more than the equivalent amount in new revenues. Even these
modest proposals were tabled. Recently a newly appointed joint committee
has begun to turn its attention to the more reasonable problem of how to
develop better means of intergovernmental collaboration as a way to prevent
overcentralization of power.
Disengagement, then, can not be considered as a practical way to solve
the problems of intergovernmental relations. The dynamic nature of Amer-
ican society mitigates against separation, either by disengagement or central-
ization, in the foreseeable future. Intergovernmental collaboration (rather
than separation or centralization) has developed as the dominant mode of
the system precisely in response to the dynamic nature of our society as it is
tempered by our common values of democratic self-government. Histori-
cally, the need for collaboration has been generated by the emergence of
the same problems to confront all levels of government at, eff'ectively, the
same time. In the nineteenth century, the conquest of the rural-land frontier
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and the problems it created (education, communications, economic growth,
and slavery) generated the tasks government had to undertake. In our day,
the urban industrial (and now the metropolitan-technological) frontier has
repeated the process.
Local Governments in the Federal System
How do the local communities view this collaborative system? With a
few exceptions, they do not view it with hostility. For example, local com-
munities seek federal aid in many ways and for many purposes. City officials
seek expert advice on building a jail, developing a park, or disposing of
their citizens' garbage. Local businessmen seek funds for airport improve-
ments, transfer of an old military installation for industrial development, or
grants of firefighting equipment under the civil defense program. Civic
"improvers" seek grants for urban renewal, FHA loans for community con-
servation, or FBI instructors to improve the quality of their local police
force. It is a massive task just to list the federal aids and services available
to local government— from plumbing codes to marina design to disaster
relief. These federal activities in their community are not viewed locally as
the forcible intrusion of a distant central government but, almost invariably,
as the successful consequences of local efforts to secure federal benefits to
serve local ends. These benefits are considered to be good for community
and nation both. Generally, the same holds true in state-local relations.
This local view, developed over time through concrete experience rather
than by abstract logic, is historically the correct one. If the system appears
on the surface to be mildly chaotic, this does not mean that some order
does not exist within its bounds. While every governmental plane may be
involved in all governmental activities, each has it own locus of power and
control that jointly provide focal points for the organization of the system.
Let us return to our overdivided sanitarian. With all the hats he may wear
from time to time, it is clear to one and all that he is basically a county
official. His formal place and day-to-day informal ties revolve around his
position within and attachment to the county he serves. Thus, it may be
said that organized local government can serve as the focal point for gov-
ernment locally, no matter what the source of a particular program. I say
"can serve" because in many ways this depends on the particular local
government in question— whether it wants to or not. The very overlapping
nature of the system gives a local community and its local governments a
multiplicity of "cracks" (both in the sense of blows generated locally and of
fissures through which they may penetrate) by which to bend any given
program to its own needs. But it is up to the individual community whether
it will use these opportunities or not. Comparison of medium-sized cities in
Illinois reveals significant differences in the amount of federal aid utilized
locally. These differences almost always reflect the level of interest in the
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local community. In Rockford, for example, where accepting federal aid
is frowned upon, virtually none is received. In Rock Island, on the other
hand, the city government has made considerable effort— quite successfully
— to obtain federal assistance for locally initiated projects.
As a focal point in the federal system, local government serves in five
major capacities: as acquirer of outside aid for local needs; as adapter of
government functions and services to local conditions; as experimenter with
new functions and services (or new twists for traditional ones) ; as initiator
of governmental programs that spread across state and nation; and under-
lying them all, as a means by which a local community can pay the "'ante"
necessary to "sit in the game" (i.e., secure an effective voice in governmental
decisions that affect it) .
Local government as acquirer. The most fundamental "proof" of the
noncentralized nature of American collaborative federalism lies in the role
which local governments must play in order to benefit from most forms of
federal and state aid. Even where such outside aid is available, the local
governments must actively seek their communities' shares from the limited
amount to be distributed. This means that the local governments must
initiate and develop specific projects (or at the very least cooperate fully
with the local initiators and developers) ; prepare the requisite governmental
facilities; set and maintain the proper standards; and, in many cases, utilize
the
"multiple crack" system to campaign for their requested share at the
state and federal levels.
Local government as adapter. Perhaps the best example of the power
of local government to adapt or modify existing programs to meet local
situations is furnished by the great grant-in-aid programs. Grant programs
are established to utilize the greater ability of the general government to
harness the nation's wealth for public purposes, to develop a means for
sharing our national wealth with some degree of nationwide equity, and to
establish certain minimum nationwide standards for specific governmental
services. (The same goals can be seen in state-local grant programs on a
reduced scale.) What is commonly considered to be federal supervision of
these programs is largely national supervision by a process of mutual accom-
modation. Leading state and local officials, acting primarily through their
professional organizations, are in great measure responsible for formulating
the very standards that federal officials then try to implement.
In addition, there exists areas of varying scope in which local officials
can take discretionary action in line with local conditions, subsequent to
professional formulation of nationwide standards.
If a specific situation demands adjustment and all else fails, local gov-
ernments can turn to locally elected congressmen and legislators, who are,
almost without exception, more responsive to local interests than central
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directives. The veiy nature of the electoral and party systems makes this so.
Loose national party coalitions of state political organizations and state
party dependence on locally elected representatives give local interests
powerful leverage within the system. As a result, national political leaders
serve as spokesmen and "watchdogs" for local (as well as state, constituent,
and group) interests not only in matters concerning the grant programs,
but also in fields of so-called "exclusive" federal jurisdictions— including
foreign affairs. (This is generally true in state-local relations also, although
it seems that the local governments have somewhat less influence, perhaps
because it is a relationship within a unitary state.)
Local government as initiator. This access to both federal and state
governments through elected representatives and professional associations
also gives local governments the power to initiate new programs and services.
This power is often unused, but when an aggressive community faces a
problem for which no readily available solution is apparent, it is likely to
use the aforementioned connections, first to find common ground with other
communities facing similar problems and, ultimately, to secure state or
federal-state assistance. Probably a majority of the federally aided domestic
programs, ranging from agricultural extension to urban renewal, were first
conceived or originated by local governments or local government officials
in much this way.
Local government as experimenter. Often a program of service con-
ceived locally is also first tested locally before larger units of government
adopt it and foster it in other communities. In recent years, improved
educational methods and services have been and are being developed for
statewide and nationwide use after experimentation in local school systems.
Many other programs in agriculture, commerce, public improvements, and
public welfare, among others, have taken similar roads. The role of local
government as experimenter has traditionally been an important one in the
maintenance of a viable political pluralism in the United States.
Local government as a means of participating in the governmental proc-
ess. This function of local governments within the context of American
federalism underlies all the others. Although not often recognized as such,
there have always been two major reasons behind the establishment of new
governments in the United States. One is a desire for the greater or lesser
degree of autonomy that accompanies any organized government. In local
government this may mean the power to levy taxes in a special district; the
power to set educational, as well as taxation, policies in a school district;
municipal powers in a city, and so forth. The other is a desire to have a
base of operations, a focal point, within the American governmental com-
plex. Developing a formal base of operations is the best and easiest way for
a community to gain and maintain support, money, aid, recognition, repre-
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sentation, or whatever its political goals might be within the system. In
the language of poker, this is the way a community pays the ante required
to sit in the game.
Local Government and the States
Although there are major formal and informal differences between
federal-state-local and federal-local relations on the one hand and state-
local and interlocal relations on the other, the intergovernmental questions
that are raised in all four categories can be examined as questions of focus
of power, acquisition of aid, adaptation of program, initiation and experi-
mentation with services, and "ante." The major diflferences are that federal
relations with local governments are rarely direct and even less often backed
by operative coercive powers. The federal government must rely upon
persuasion, contract, and, only as a last resort, withdrawal of support. The
state government, on the other hand, has very definite powers of coercion
since local governments are, without exception, creatures of their state,
"home rule" notwithstanding.
Certainly in Illinois the state government is the source and central
authority for all the local governments within its boundaries (even when it
comes to soil conservation districts and the like, created by the state virtually
at the behest of the federal government) . The General Assembly serves as
the constituent assembly for Illinois local governments, creating and defining
them, limiting or extending their powers, even delimiting the possible forms
of government they may adopt. In order to amend the local "constitution,"
it is often necessary to go to Springfield
— unless the legislature has already
provided for options which can be exercised locally, as in the choice of
municipal governmental forms. The state even functions as a local legis-
lature and executive in a wide variety of fields, sometimes retaining exclusive
powers and sometimes sharing them with the city council or county board.
The sum of a state's constitutional and political powers within its
boundaries and its constitutional position and political role within the
federal system as a whole places the states at the keystone in the govern-
mental arch. In its central position, the state serves as a stimulator of local
government activities and as mediator between its local governments and
Washington and, where necessary, between its local governments and other
states. It is significant that this does not hold true for Chicago and cities
like it. When a state government fails to fulfill its role as mediator, in this
sense, the resulting vacuum leads to a serious weakening of the system.
Often the states have refused to accept their role vis-a-vis the large (and
not-so-large) metropolitan centers within their boundaries. The first con-
sequences of this have been effectively to deny these great urban centers
their due in terms of national concern, aid, and support. The second con-
sequence is for these cities to develop channels of direct communication with
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the federal government and, insofar as is possible, to bypass their state
governments. As yet this latter course has succeeded in limited areas only,
but pressures are building up that may lead to radical changes in the federal
system.
Interlocal Relations
Whereas in both federal-local and state-local relations the larger gov-
ernmental units possess sovereign powers in their dealings with the smaller
ones, in the give-and-take of interlocal relations the several governments
involved stand in approximately equal formal relationships with one another.
While the
"overflowing" of the metropolis has led to new problems of
intergovernmental relations, the overlapping of local governments is not a
new phenomenon and is not restricted to urban areas. Any county in Illi-
nois, for example, has within its boundaries a county government, munici-
palities, organized townships (except for seventeen commission counties),
school districts, and special districts. According to the Bureau of the
Census, in 1957 no county in the state had less than fourteen local govern-
ments and none had less than three municipalities within its boundaries.
(That same year, the Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, metropolitan
area had only nine local governments.) It is clear that means for successful
interlocal cooperation are necessary for the rural as well as for the urban
areas in Illinois. The difference is that in the heavily urbanized areas, the
pressures of population and economics serv^e to point up the problems of
conflicting and overlapping jurisdictions to a much greater degree.
The development of metropolitan areas has given rise to the demand
for either new forms of local government or new forms of interlocal collab-
oration. This problem occurs in two forms in Illinois. On the one hand,
there is the situation that exists in the six-county Chicago metropolitan
area, where 978 local governments (201 municipalities) functioned in 1957.
On the other hand, there are seven medium-sized metropolitan areas, all
except two of which are confined to single counties with varying numbers of
local governments (Table 2). Most of the present proposals for bettering
TABLE 2. GOVERNMENTS WITHIN ILLINOIS METROPOLITAN AREAS
intergovernmental relations in metropolitan areas, with one major excep-
tion, are based on the assumption that the relationship between contiguous
(and overlapping) local governments is potentially a federal one. That is,
the cities in a metropolitan area are related to each other much as counties
are to a state (in a unitary system) or as states are to each other (in a
federal system), by fundamentally political ties. Hence, most proposals for
metropolitan reorganization have been either to consolidate the governments
in the metropolitan area into one big government or to create a new "fed-
eral" government for the area to handle problems considered to be areawide
while leaving "local" problems in the hands of still existing local govern-
ments. With the single exception of Miami-Dade County, Florida, this
approach has failed to win popular support wherever it has been submitted
to the voters.
The only different approach is that being developed in Los Angeles
County, California
— the so-called Lakewood Plan,- which has probably
been the most successful attempt at interlocal collaboration in this country
to date. The basic assumption underlying the Lakewood Plan is that the
best possible political relationship within the metropolitan area is one that
provides "the benefits of large scale organization while maintaining local
control over all aspects of municipal government." This implies that each
community has a legitimate right to its own government since it has some-
thing to offer the area as a whole. At the same time, each community (as
well as the entire area) has certain needs which it can not meet alone.
These local and areawide needs of each community are not uniform at all;
consequently, neither consolidation nor federalism can provide the means
to solve the problems. What is needed is a means by which one central
agency provides services to individual cities without becoming a so-called
"supergovernment."
The method devised in Los Angeles County has been predicated not on
political theory so much as on the market relationship. The county is
prepared to offer an almost complete line of governmental services to each
municipality on a contract basis. Each municipality is free to select or
reject any service in light of its own policies, thus keeping a high degree
of policy control in local hands. At the same time, most services are
administered uniformly and efficiently throughout the county since they are
supplied in full by one governmental unit which is large enough to operate
at a high degree of efficiency. The county, in turn, maintains high stand-
^ This section is primarily based on "The Lakewood Plan," by Samuel K. Gove,
prepared for the Northeastern Illinois Metropolitan Area Local Governmental Serv-
ices Commission of the Illinois General Assembly, July, 1960 (Urbana: Institute of
Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois), after a Commission field trip
to California to observe the plan in operation. It is very likely the best account of
the plan and its operations available.
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ards of service and helps newly settled areas incorporate (i.e., pay the ante)
under the terms of the plan so that their residents can avail themselves of
municipal services.
The success of this plan in Los Angeles County is due to a combination
of factors peculiar to the Los Angeles area, including really nonpartisan local
government; a high degree of administrative professionalization ; relative
elasticity in governmental institutions due to a rapidly growing population;
and absence of serious racial and minority group tensions in most of the
area. Nevertheless, the apparent success of this very different solution for
the metropolitan problem makes it worthy of further study for possible
adaptation in other areas.
Summary
The problems of intergovernmental collaboration to provide public
services are fundamental in a democratic federal system. They have always
existed in the American federal system in substantially the same form, and
certain general institutions and techniques for dealing with them have been
developed in the experience of 170 years. Local governments must accom-
modate themselves to dealing with these problems in somewhat different
ways, depending on the structural division operative in specific cases:
federal-state-local (or federal-local) collaboration, state-local relationships,
or interlocal accommodations.
As population pressures increase and government on all levels becomes
more complex, the basic problem of intergovernmental relations is not to
try to limit interaction but to transform it into the most effective collabora-
tion possible. "Effective" in this sense means the provision of necessary
services in a manner calculated to strengthen the political institutions
deemed valuable in our society.
In this light, the following questions are suggested, some of which
deserve our continued attention:
How do we secure the benefits of collaboration while preserving demo-
cratic federal values? What roles do we want the federal, state, and local
governments to play in modern government? What forms should federal-
state-local collaboration take to avoid centralization of power? What kinds
of aid should be given to local governments? Should federal and state aid
take different forms? Should there be direct federal-local collaboration on
a formal basis? How much and what kinds of discretion should local gov-
ernments have in utilizing federal and state aid? What role should local
governments play in initiating and experimenting with public services?
What obligations do local governments have to pioneer in the governmental
field? How much responsibility should local governments have to assume
in the quest for outside aid?
In dealing with problems of overlapping and contiguous local govern-
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ments, what forms should interlocal collaboration take? What are the
respective virtues and limitations of the following approaches to interlocal
relations: laissez-faire, ad hoc cooperative, federal, and contractual?
Should some local governments be consolidated? Should new local govern-
ments be created to provide needed services? If so, what kind? Should new
municipal governments be formed just to control policy matters of local
interest? What possibilities are there for the adaptation of a contractual
system to different political environments?
Would constitutional home rule strengthen municipalities and munici-
pal government? Are cities in states without home rule (such as Illinois)
less autonomous in practice? Have they less power to protect their own
interests vis-a-vis the state?
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL POLITICS
SAMUEL K. GOVE
Important to the functioning of local governments are the opportunities
for the individual citizen to make his views known and to influence local
governmental action. Although a citizen can influence the course of local
government in a number of ways, elections provide the main avenue by
which he can participate. This paper is mainly concerned with local poli-
tics and the election process.
In Illinois, local political systems present sharp contrasts. In some areas,
well-organized local political systems tend to dominate the local govern-
ments; in other areas, local political organizations appear to be very weak
and, frequently, almost nonexistent. This appearance of weakness, however,
may be overestimated because political organizations tend to be much more
conspicuous in urban than in rural areas, and the resulting tendency is to
discount the rural organizations without careful examination of how strong
they are, or indeed, of whether they exist at all.
A fundamental question in the consideration of local politics is whether
one should consider local government as a political activity and as a part
of the political structure of the state. Should local government be looked
on as the ground level of the state's political system; or is local government
different from other governments, and thus off-limits for partisan political
activity?
It certainly is not clear from a study of the situation in Illinois whether
local government is or is not a political activity. The main impression one
gets from the present Illinois picture is confusion, probably for two main
reasons: the structure of local government and the mixture of partisan
and nonpartisan elections at the local level. A multiplicity of local govern-
ments exists in Illinois, and there has been a concerted effort to separate
these governments and to make them independent of one another. This
separation has tended to make it most difficult, if not virtually impossible,
for one local political organization to work successfully in all local elections.
The other complicating factor has been the movement in this country
and this state to make local goverrmients nonpartisan. The arguments ad-
vanced by both sides are mentioned in some detail later. Generally, the
nonpartisan movement has been aimed at taking national politics out of
local government. Nonpartisan local elections in Illinois have been widely
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accepted by municipalities and special districts, less widely accepted by
townships, and not accepted at all by counties. Even where nonpartisanship
has been accepted, it is not unusual for local political parties (i.e., parties
with names other than Republican or Democratic) to exist. These local
parties vary considerably from place to place; in some parts of the state
they are on-going, well organized groups; in others they are more or less
ad hoc groups organized for a single election.
Local Elective Officials
With the multiplicity of local governments in this state, one would
expect, and actually finds, a large number of local offices filled by election.
There has never been a tabulation of the total number of elective officials in
Illinois, although such a total figure would undoubtedly be extremely large.
However, such a figure alone would be rather meaningless because of the
varied powers and duties of the many elective officials, and in many cases,
because of the general lack of public concern with the offices. The only
significant fact to emerge from such a tabulation would be that the "short"
ballot movement has had little impact on Illinois local government. On the
other hand, the "long" ballot in Illinois is nowhere as extreme as in jurisdicr
tions elsewhere because contests for local offices are held at several different
elections. Thus, the number of offices to be filled at any one election (other
than statewide general elections, which include both state and local offices)
generally is not unwieldly.
In county governments, eight elective officers are common to all 102
counties, with the larger counties having certain additional elective posi-
tions. (The separate organization of Cook County results in more county-
wide officers being elected there.) All of the county officers, after having
been nominated in April party primaries, are elected for four-year terms at
general elections in November of even-numbered years. About half the
county officers are elected in presidential election years, and the others are
elected in off-year general elections. Incumbents of two offices (sheriff
and treasurer) can not succeed themselves, and this has had considerable
effect on local politics, especially in regard to competition for these two
offices.
Township elections are held in the spring of odd-numbered years. In
each township a supervisor is elected for a four-year term; in the larger
townships, assistant supervisors are elected, the number determined on the
basis of population. In larger city-townships, such as Springfield and Rock-
ford, as many as seventeen assistant supervisors are elected (half at one
April election, the remainder at the April election two years hence). These
elections provide an example of a truly "long" local government ballot. In
addition to the supervisors and assistant supervisors, other township officials
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are elected for four-year terms. A different elective organization is found
in commission counties.
Unlike county office nominees, township office nominees are generally
selected by party caucuses (or by petition) rather than by a formal primary.
Party caucuses vary considerably in the degree of formality. In some town-
ships printed ballots are used; in many others a show of hands at an open
meeting determines the nominee. City townships in cities having boards of
election commissioners hold regular primaries for township offices.
The offices to be filled by election in municipalities vary considerably
from community to community, depending on the population of the com-
munity and its form of government. All municipalities elect a mayor, or
equivalent officer, in spring elections, in addition to other legislative and
administrative officials. The situation in regard to the selection of nominees
for municipal office follows the general pattern for townships. The nomi-
nations can be made by primary, caucus, or petition, depending on the
population and form of government and on whether organized political
parties participate formally in local elections. The cities with commission
government are required to have special "run-off" primary elections.
In addition to the elective officials for general purpose governments,
popularly elected governing boards administer many special district govern-
ments in Illinois. Most of these are school districts; others include drainage,
sanitary, park, soil conservation, and wildlife districts.
Local Election Calendar
It has been mentioned that there are many local elections held at differ-
ent times. The present confusing calendar emphasizes the separateness of
the various local governments, although it is not clear whether the present
situation is due to a concerted legislative effort to separate one government
from another or to legislative oversight. Along with the tendency to empha-
size separateness, the election calendar makes it possible for partisan politics
to play an influential role in one government and not in another.
The present election calendar provides that in even-numbered years there
are to be school elections in April (usually on a Saturday), a general pri-
mary in April (the county board of school trustees is elected at this primary) ,
and a general election in November. In addition, there are June elections
in most even-numbered years for circuit or supreme court judges.
In odd-numbered years, the pattern is more confusing. In most places
there are both township and municipal caucuses or primaries (probably
held on separate dates) in February or March; and the city and township
elections in April, probably on separate dates. Under the new justices-of-
the-peace law, the spring election pattern is further confused, as the justices
and constables are nominated and elected from election districts not co-
terminous with any single local governmental unit. Also, park board mem-
38
bers are elected in April, usually on a date separate from that of other
elections. In commission counties, a primary is also held in April for the
oflfice of county commissioner alone, and in November the general election
is held for county commissioner. In addition to these many regular elections,
special elections are frequently held to fill vacancies or to consider bond or
tax referenda.
Although statutory dates for city elections vary from community to com-
munity, the individual voter, who participates only in the election in his
own city, is not affected. However, when the township election date is
different from the municipal election date in the same community, con-
siderable confusion results. Furthermore, occasionally municipal and town-
ship elections, or other special district elections, are held on the same day
but in different polling places.
The present calendar tends to reduce voter participation in the several
elections, particularly at the township and municipal levels, although
exceptions to this generalization can be cited. In elections for county officers,
voter participation is generally about 10 per cent less than the vote for the
top of the ballot in the general election (i.e., for President, U.S. senator, or
state treasurer) . Participation in general elections is, as a rule, considerably
higher than in local elections. There is no evidence, however, that the
larger number of participants in general elections for county offices are
more or less concerned or informed about county government and its prob-
lems than they are about the problems of other local governments.
Competition for Local Office
The extent of competition for local office varies with the different levels
of government although there seems to be more competition for county
office than for either city or township offices. However, even at the county
level it is not uncommon for one of the parties not to contest an office.
At the county level in the six elections in the period 1948-1958, one
party failed to place a candidate on the general election ballot for the eight
offices common to all counties in 549 instances. Even where there are two
candidates on the ballot, there is no assurance of a real contest, for some
candidates may offer only token opposition. The office least contested is
that of county judge, while the office of sheriff is most frequently contested.
Table 3 shows the no-contests during the ten-year period. If the two offices
(sheriff and treasurer) where incumbents can not succeed themselves are
eliminated from this tabulation, the degree of competition is about the
same in presidential and nonpresidential years.
To give some indication of whether the lack of competition is wide-
spread or concentrated in only a few counties. Table 4, on county slates
partly or completely noncontested, was prepared.
At the township level, there seems to be even less competition for
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TABLE 3. "NO CONTESTS" FOR COUNTY OFFICE, GENERAL ELECTIONS 1948-1958"
cause there is little competition or whether competition falls off when the
form of the ballot is decided.
The data are too inadequate to venture a generalized statement on the
amount of competition in city elections. Examples of partisan cities with
little or no competition can be cited, as can examples of cities with non-
partisan commission government or with local parties having considerable
competition. One might guess that the degree of competition is more closely
tied in with the size of the municipality than with the form of the ballot;
the larger cities are apt to have more competition than smaller municipali-
ties regardless of the method of electing local officials.
It has been said that the real competition for local office, particularly at
the county level, takes place in the primary. Unfortunately, the data to test
this statement are practically nonexistent. However, data for the 1960
Illinois primary for county offices are available, and if this primary is
typical, then it would seem that there is little competition here. To learn
whether there is more competition in larger counties, a tabulation was made
for the offices found in the most populous counties. It would appear that
there is slightly more competition in these counties. The data were also
analyzed to see if there is more competition in one-party counties than in
counties with strong interparty competition. From an examination of the
ten most Democratic and the ten most Republican counties, it can be con-
cluded that there is about the same amount of competition in these counties
as in Illinois counties generally,
A limitation to the use of the 1960 primary for a generalization on
competition is that the county offices contested in presidential years are
thought, as a group, to be of less importance than the offices up for election
in nonpresidential general elections. Comparable statewide data for earlier
nonpresidential county primaries are not available, but in four rather strong
one-party counties (Bureau, DeKalb, Stark, and Wayne) data are available
and suggest that there may be more competition for the offices contested in
nonpresidential elections than for the offices contested in presidential elec-
tions. This is particularly true for the offices of sheriff and treasurer.
Generally, it does not seem that there is enough competition for county
TABLE 5. COMPETITION FOR OFFICE IN ILLINOIS COUNTIES, 1960 PRIMARIES
TABLE 6. COMPETITION FOR COUNTY OFFICE IN NINETEEN
MOST POPULOUS COUNTIES, 1960 PRIMARIES'"
local elections, a person affiliated with the national party that is a weak
minority in a particular community is, in effect, disfranchised.
The opponents of nonpartisanship argue that it is not uncommon for
the local political parties to participate actively in nonpartisan elections,
thereby negating the nonpartisan concept. They say it is generally con-
sidered desirable to strengthen the parties and that this can be done by
encouraging young people to seek political elective office. Thus, if political
parties are encouraged to participate actively in elections from the township
level to the national government, a "political career ladder" system can be
established. And lastly, it is argued that the concept that national and local
issues are unrelated is becoming obsolete in our changing federal system.
It is not unusual today for county and city officials to have direct relation-
ships with federal agencies in Washington.^
Partisanship and Local Elections
The extent of partisanship in local elections, as indicated earlier, varies
considerably at the different levels of local government. County elections
are conducted with national party labels throughout the state, and these
offices are filled at statewide general elections. Only rarely does an inde-
pendent candidate file for county office; in the Illinois county elections in
the period 1948-1958, only twenty-four independent candidates ran for
office, and of these only three were elected. Although independents occa-
sionally file for county office, third party candidates (with one exception,
the Progressive party slate in Cook County in 1948) have not filed in recent
years.
National parties are also important in township elections, although they
are not as frequently found on the ballots as in county elections. A survey
of about one-third of the townships in the 1959 township elections shows
that 80 per cent had Republican or Democratic party labels on the ballot.
(In a few instances there was a third party label, sometimes taking the
place of the Republican or Democratic label.) About 9 per cent of the
townships surveyed had only local party labels, while 10 per cent had no
party labels at all. In about 10 per cent of the townships with national
party labels, there were also independent candidates on the ballot.^
In general, there is little consistent pattern in the use or nonuse of party
^ The present system of mixing partisan and nonpartisan local elections can have
some strange effects in our changing federal system. In the 1959 election in Cham-
paign, the winning candidate for mayor held a state government position subject to
the federal Hatch Act. (Mayor is not a full-time position.) Because the elections in
Champaign are nonpartisan, this individual was eligible to run for office, but he
would have been ineligible in the neighboring city of Urbana, which has partisan
elections. This unusual situation is probably more of a commentary on federal regu-
lations than on nonpartisan local elections.
^ Data for this survey were taken from available local newspapers. No attempt
was made to use a random sample.
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labels in township elections. From the townships surveyed, it seems that
most of the nonpartisan or local party elections are held either in the
northestem part of the state or in the Illinois area across from St. Louis.
Some strong one-party counties have partisan township elections, while
other one-party counties have nonpartisan or local party systems. There
seems to be no relationship to the economic background of a county, to its
past voting behavior, or to other obvious factors in determining whether
township elections are to be partisan or nonpartisan.
Even within a single county, considerable variations can be found. In
small Stark County in 1959, for example, two townships had Republican
and Democratic tickets on the ballot, four townships had local parties
opposing the Republican slate, one township had only local parties com-
peting, and the eighth township had no party labels at all. A somewhat
similar situation was found in neighboring Bureau County.
The decision to use national or local party labels or none at all on the
ballot is a local decision for the township. However, for certain cities—
those having the commission form of government and those having the
council-manager form without wards -— state law requires that elections be
on a no-party-label basis. Under the other forms of city and village govern-
ment, the "party or no party" decision is made locally. Although accurate
figures are not available, it is quite clear that many more cities use non-
partisan or local party labels than do townships.*
The practice among municipalities in using party labels in local elections
follows no pattern, and it would seem that local custom or history is the
basis for the decision. Relatively small communities use partisan elections, as
well as do large ones, and, contrariwise, both large and small communities
use local party labels or nonpartisan elections. The partisan election cities
are well scattered throughout the state. Some of the partisan cities are
found in one-party counties, and others in counties with strong interparty
competition. This confusing picture can be illustrated by a partial list of
cities having partisan elections: Urbana (1950 population: 22,834) and
St. Joseph (941), Champaign County; Pana (6,178), Christian County;
Cicero (67,554) and Evergreen Park (19,732), Cook County; LaHarpe
(1,295) and Warsaw (2,002), Hancock County; Emington (150) and
Kankakee (25,856), Kankakee County; Carlinville (5,116), Macoupin
County; Monticello (2,612), Piatt County; Moline (37,797), Rock Island
^ The 1960 Municipal Yearbook includes data on elections in cities of over 5,000
population (1950 population except for cities which had special censuses since 1950).
Of the 160 Illinois cities in this category, 102 were listed as having nonpartisan elec-
tions. (Thirty-six of the 102 had the commission form of government and were by
law nonpartisan.) The other 58 cities were listed as having partisan elections, but
the compilers of the Yearbook grouped cities using both national and local party
labels into the partisan category.
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County; and Minonk (1,995), Woodford County. Chicago has a mixed
pattern, with the mayor being elected on a partisan basis at the same time
as the fifty aldermen are elected on a nonpartisan basis.
In Chicago, and in other places throughout the state, the nonpartisan
elections are nonpartisan in name only. Many examples of open partisan
participation in nonpartisan elections can be cited. The participation in
Chicago aldermanic elections is quite open, as it is in Chicago Heights,
according to a recent study of that community.'' In other commission cities,
the candidates for mayor and commissioners run as a slate, a fact which is
openly cited in the nevvspapers. Sometimes (for example, in Downers
Grove) a slate runs with a local party label in newspaper advertisements,
although the label is not found on the ballot. More frequently, however,
the candidates for mayor and commissioner in commission cities run as
individuals, and voters generally disregard the candidates' party affiliation,
even if it is known.
There is one other local election practice that has developed in certain
communities, particularly in the suburbs of Chicago. This is the selection
of
"agreed" slates by local groups prior to the election. These slates are
seldom contested. In Winnetka, where "agreed" slates have been the prac-
tice for over fifty years, candidates are nominated by a fifty-member caucus
committee. The candidates and party platform are then approved at a
caucus meeting. A similar practice has developed in La Grange, and in both
communities the citizens frown on people "vying for public offices." The
chairman of the Winnetka caucus was quoted as saying: "A lot of honest
people are willing to serve if they don't have to subject themselves to
political sniping, and that's what you get when you have rival parties."^
It obviously takes a homogeneous community for this type of system to be
successful.
It is exceedingly difficult to generalize about local political parties in
Illinois. In some communities they are on-going groups with definite pro-
grams; in others they are groups banded together for a single election; and
in still other communities the local party label is solely a device for getting
the name of the candidate on the ballot. Even where the groups are
on-going, there is no assurance that the party will use the same name in
every election. Since established political parties by law must hold nominat-
ing conventions or primaries, name changes are made so that the party
can nominate candidates without holding either a convention or a primary.
In at least one community (Belleville, St. Clair County), local parties
are more than ad hoc groups, and run candidates in both city and township
° Charles S. Liebman, Some Political Effects of the Functional Differentiation of
Suburbs, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1960).
° Thomas E. Sunderland, quoted in the Chicago Sun-Times, April 9, 1959.
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elections, thereby providing the machinery for a close and effective working
relationship between these two governmental levels. Belleville has a city
township, with township boundaries coterminous with those of the city.
Most of the on-going local parties are found in the suburban communi-
ties in the Chicago metropolitan area. These parties usually have platforms
and advocate local programs; in Brookfield, for example, the parties had
veiy specific platforms in 1959. In several communities in the central part
of the state, Anti-License or Citizen Temperance parties, which obviously
are concerned with local liquor problems, appear on the ballot.
Most of the special districts have nonpartisan elections, although the
Chicago Sanitar)' District trustees and the bi-county East Side and Prairie
DuPont levee and sanitary districts trustees are elected as partisans.
Consequences of Partisan and Nonpartisan Governments
An obvious question to be raised in connection with the confusing role
of political parties in local government is, what are the consequences of the
present arrangement? Most of the discussion in this paper has been on the
role of the parties in local elections; some of the consequences are found
in election results, but more important consequences are in the actual
administration of local governments. Although ver)' little research has been
done on the effect of the mixture of partisan and nonpartisan local govern-
ments, it seems that the present arrangement can hardly help but encourage
conflicts in intergovernmental relationships.
For example, consideration has been given to the establishment of urban
counties in Illinois and elsewhere. These counties would perform many
municipal-type services, and would necessarily have to work closely with the
municipal and township governments in a county. In some cases it might
be necessary' to transfer a function or service from a local government to
the reorganized county government. But in Illinois the desirable local
governmental relations would be impeded by the emphasis on partisan
politics at one level and on nonpartisan politics at another. This would be
particularly true of the transfer of a function involving the movement of
personnel who might have been employed on a patronage basis. The best
example of an urban county that performs municipal-type functions is Los
Angeles County, California. There all local governments, including the
county, are nonpartisan, and concurrently there has developed a high degree
of personnel professionalization. As a result, the intergovernmental relation-
ships exist without the partisan considerations that one would find in most
Illinois counties and that well might work against the establishment of an
urban county here.
Another type of intergovernmental conflict in Illinois that is brought
about by the confusing situation is the relationship between the county
board (with its mixture of legislative and administrative responsibilities)
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and other county elective administrative officers. The legal relationships
between the board, which is composed of supervisors and assistant super-
visors elected from townships, and the several elective officers (sheriff,
county clerk, etc.) is not clear, although the practical relationship is prob-
ably improved when the majority of the board and the elective officers are
active in the same political party. But when the supervisors and assistants
are elected on a nonpartisan basis, as is the case in several counties, and the
elective officers are elected as partisans, as is the case in all counties, the
possibility for conflict is greatly increased.
In some twenty Illinois cities, there are so-called city townships where
the boundaries of both the city and township are coterminous and annexa-
tions to the city are automatically added to the area of the township. In
some cases the township officers are elected as partisans and the city officials
are elected as nonpartisans. This is the case in Champaign, for example.
Although the city and township have separate governmental service respon-
sibilities, there must be a certain amount of cooperation between the two
governments.
Similar questions on intergovernmental relations between special district
governments and other general purpose local governments can be raised.
Special district governments, particularly school districts, are as a rule truly
nonpartisan. However, the elective school officials must work closely with
the other local officials on many matters. If there is a partisan view on the
part of one set of officials and a nonpartisan view on the part of the other
set, the possibility for conflict is great.
It has been suggested several times in this paper that it sometimes is
difficult to understand why a particular community has established a parti-
san election system and another a nonpartisan system. This point can
well be illustrated by the practices in the adjoining cities of Champaign and
Urbana. Champaign has nonpartisan elections, while neighboring Urbana
elects its city officials on a partisan basis. The two communities are quite
similar in regard to social and economic factors, and the University of
Illinois plays an important role in the life of each community. But the
present partisan-nonpartisan election pattern has been well established and
accepted. There is no indication that partisanship has hindered the rela-
tionship between the two communities. A few years ago, when there was
a campaign and election to merge the two cities, the question of whether the
new combined government would have partisan or nonpartisan elections
was never publicly raised as a campaign issue.
Conclusions
The main point for discussion from the preceding material is the ques-
tion of whether local government is a political activity. If the answer is in
the affirmative, there are certain moves that could be made to strengthen
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the political role. If the answer is in the negative, the opposite actions
should be taken to reinforce the independence of local governments.
If local government is to be looked upon as a political activity, the local
election calendar should probably be revised to provide for the election of
all local officials in a single election, or, at most, two separate elections. If
local government is not a political activity, the separation of local govern-
ment elections probably should be continued, and county government elec-
tions should be separated from state and national elections.
If the local election calendar were to be revised, there might result a
very "long ballot." Whether this would be a problem depends on whether
one considers the arguments of the proponents of the "short ballot" valid,
or whether one has confidence that the voters can evaluate the candidates
for a large number of local offices. The "long ballot" might not be con-
sidered a problem if all local elections were conducted on a partisan basis
and party circles were provided for straight-ticket voting.
If local government is to be looked upon as a political activity, concern
can be raised about the relative amount of competition now found for local
office. Thus, steps should be taken to encourage more interparty competi-
tion in local elections.
And lastly, if local government is looked upon as a political activity,
local officials should probably be elected as partisans, and existing non-
partisan elections should be discouraged. On the other hand, if local
government is not to be considered a political activity, the nonpartisan
movement should probably be extended to include elections for all local
government offices.
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LEGAL STATUS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
I
An Outline of Legal Relationships
george m. platt
The number of local governmental units runs into the thousands in
Illinois; their activities vary from the broad functions of counties, cities,
villages, and incorporated towns to the limited functions of many special
purpose units, such as districts for schools, soil conservation, mass transpor-
tation, and mosquito abatement. In a broad sense, the legal status of all
these local governmental units is directly affected by the constitution,
although they may be created solely by statute/ By this it is meant that
the constitution imposes limitations on the Illinois General Assembly which
it must observe when contemplating statutory enactments. For example, in
all cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall
be enacted; certain constitutional requirements as to procedure for passage
must be observed; property must not be taken without due process of law.
There are other such constitutional directives and limitations, but these
serve to demonstrate the point that the constitution generally affects all
local units which may be created and controlled by statutes enacted by the
Illinois General Assembly.
Despite the fact that all local governmental units are affected by the
constitution, only a few kinds of these local units are specifically affected by
constitutional provisions to the extent that the General Assembly's supreme
authority to abolish them is impaired. These local units whose continued
existence is insured as long as the provisions of the constitution remain
unaltered include counties, school districts, and the City of Chicago. With
these exceptions, the legal status
—• in fact, the very existence— of all local
governmental units is within the discretion of the General Assembly. Thus,
it is legally possible for the General Assembly to alter, abolish, or combine
all, save the exceptions noted above, of the thousands of local governments
throughout the state.
Counties
The most important provisions relating specifically to the legal status of
' The constitution referred to throughout this paper is the Illinois Constitution
of 1870. The statutes referred to are those compiled in the Illinois Revised Statutes,
1959, Illinois State Bar Association Edition. For a tabular summary of local govern-
mental units in Illinois by county, see the Appendix to this volume, on p. 83.
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counties are those dealing with their organization. Pursuant to these pro-
visions, three distinct types of county government exist in Illinois: township
form organization, commission form organization, and the form of organiza-
tion for Cook County.
Of the 102 Illinois counties, 84 are organized under the township form.
Although it is possible constitutionally for the electors of a county to vote
to abolish the township form of government and adopt the commission
form, the General Assembly is precluded by the constitution from abolishing
the township foiTn by statute. The constitutional provision having this
effect is the one which directs that the General Assembly "shall provide"
for township organization. As a result, it apparently would take an amend-
ment of the constitution before the General Assembly could abolish township
government by statute, a fact which is a continuing comfort to the advocates
of the township form and a continuing stumbling block to those who con-
tend that the township form of county government is hopelessly outmoded
and should be abolished.
The second type of county government is the commission form, which is
in operation in only 17 of the 102 counties. The continuation of this form
of government is also guaranteed by the constitution, so that it may not be
abolished by a legislative act of the General Assembly. The electors of a
county, however, may vote to change from the commission form to the
township form. Therefore, the control of the legal status of the commission
form of county government is denied to the General Assembly, just as it is
with respect to the township form of government.
The third of the three types of county government is that found exclu-
sively in Cook County. The constitution decrees that the county be gov-
erned by a board of fifteen commissioners. However, township government
continues to exist in the area of Cook County outside the corporate limits
of Chicago. This peculiar arrangement is protected by the constitution
from any unilateral action by the General Assembly aimed at abolishing or
changing it. Even the electors themselves are precluded, short of constitu-
tional amendment, from changing this form of government in Cook County.
Cities, Villages, and Incorporated Towns
Cities, villages, and incorporated towns, of which there are now well
over 1,100 in Illinois, are creatures of statute and, with the exception of the
City of Chicago, can be altered or abolished at the will of the General
Assembly. Several peculiarities presently exist with respect to the legal
status of such municipalities.
Most Illinois municipalities are incorporated under the general law
relating to cities, villages, and incorporated towns. However, at least thirty
municipalities, mostly incorporated towns, still operate under special laws
passed prior to and left undisturbed by the Illinois Constitution of 1870.
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The constitution in eflfect in Illinois before 1870 permitted special, "private"
acts, dealing by name with a municipality, which delineated its govern-
mental powers, duties, and functions. Since the adoption of the Illinois
Constitution of 1870, such "private" laws have been prohibited, except those
relating to Chicago, and the number of special charter municipalities has
dwindled to just thirty holdouts. Even in these thirty municipalities, the
general municipal law has certain effects, but its operation in the special
charter muncipalities is limited.
Despite the unique nature of the charters of the special law municipali-
ties, the General Assembly at any time can abolish their special legal status
and force them to incorporate and operate under the general municipal
law of the state. Also, special charter municipalities may at any time
voluntarily give up their charters and reincorporate under the general
municipal law if they can comply with the basic requirements relating to
population. Many observers have urged that special charters be ended in
Illinois for the sake of a more uniform system, but such exhortations to
date have been fruitless.
The City of Chicago, as usual, is in a class by itself when the legal
status of municipalities is considered. The constitution permits the General
Assembly to enact special laws dealing with Chicago by name, but only if
such laws are first submitted to a referendum and adopted by the electors
of the City of Chicago. As a result, the city operates under a portion of
the municipal law made exclusively applicable by name to Chicago. Any
amendments to this portion of the law must first be passed by the General
Assembly and then be approved by the Chicago electors before they can
take effect. This is as close as any Illinois city comes to home rule.
Despite this rather specific constitutional language, which makes manda-
tory a referendum on any law directly affecting the municipal government
of the City of Chicago, there is a way around this language which is com-
monly employed by the General Assembly. Many provisions of the general
municipal statutes are drawn so that they apply in "cities of over 500,000
inhabitants," or words to that effect; these provisions are, in fact, intended
to apply only to Chicago, but they purport to apply to a class comprising,
or in the future to comprise, more than one municipality. Such laws, once
made by the General Assembly, become binding in Chicago without ever
being submitted to a referendum in Chicago. Thus, the General Assembly
can attain its end without running afoul of the constitutional provisions
requiring a referendum in Chicago.
The explanation of this apparent contradiction is one based in technical
legal theoiy, long adhered to by the Illinois Supreme Court. This theory
maintains that there is a difference between laws which refer by name to
Chicago and laws which refer instead to "cities of over 500,000 inhabitants"
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despite the fact that Chicago is now the only city in that class and is likely
to remain so. It would be interesting to observe the reaction of the Illinois
Supreme Court if it were confronted with a statute enacted in terms appli-
cable to cities of over 500,000 which would set out a mandatory system of
government completely different from Chicago's present form of municipal
government as it exists under the law specially applicable by name to Chi-
cago. If the Supreme Court should hold such a statute invalid because it
directly affected the City of Chicago contrary to the constitutional require-
ment of a local referendum, then all of the presently existing provisions—
and there are many— drawn in terms applicable to cities of over 500,000
inhabitants would be placed in legal doubt. On the other hand, a holding
by the Illinois Supreme Court that a statute which would completely change
the form of municipal government of cities of over 500,000 is valid would
have the effect of rendering meaningless the constitutional provision requir-
ing that any statute directly affecting the government of the City of Chicago
must be adopted at a referendum in Chicago before it can take effect.
That the Supreme Court of Illinois would ever be presented with the
dilemma outlined above is at best a remote possibility. However, the
dilemma posed illustrates the unusual legal status of the municipal govern-
ment of Chicago and its relationship to the power of the General Assembly.
Special Purpose Local Government
In addition to the more generalized county and municipal units, there
are at least thirty-two kinds of special purpose local governmental units.
The total number of the various kinds of special purpose units is well over
3,000, with somewhat over half of them being school districts. In addition
to school districts, there are special districts for sanitation, drainage, mos-
quito abatement, hospitals, street lighting, port development, and parks, to
name only a few. This partial list serves to emphasize the diversity of
services performed by these local units.
The purpose of this type of local unit is highly specialized, a character-
istic which can make such a unit significantly different, at least in degree,
from the county and municipal governmental units with their broad and
varied purposes and powers. The extent to which a specialized function
set forth in law is really a limitation on the role of local government was
considered in the first paper in this volume. It is clear, in any event, that
in creating these units, the General Assembly as a practical matter has
determined that the traditional local units— the county, city, village, and
incorporated town— are incapable of performing successfully the specific
function desired. This incapability may arise from the lack of a sufficient
tax base to support the special activity or from geographical and territorial
limitations which prevent effective handling of such problems as soil erosion
and floods. In these and similar cases it is obvious that new jurisdictional
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boundaries must be designed with a view to the nature of the thing sought
to be accompHshed. Presumably, the lack of sufficient tax base to finance
the complexity of modern education has been the chief factor in the creation
of such units as consolidated community school districts.
As a result of these and other special problems, the local unit with a
specialized legal existence is flourishing, and the territorial limits of such
specialized legal entities have generally taken form without reference to
existing county or municipal lines. For example, a public library district
may be composed of territoiy lying in as many as five counties; surface
water protection districts may consist of territory in two counties; mosquito
abatement districts must be located within one county, but the size of the
district within that county is limited only by practical considerations.
Although the legal capacity and the jurisdictional boundaries of the
special purpose districts are usually different from the capacity and bound-
aries of counties and municipalities, the legal status of such special purpose
districts is determined essentially by the same principles which govern the
status of counties and municipalities. With respect to the legal status of
special purpose districts, the constitution specifically requires only that a
system of free schools be provided in some form by the General Assembly.
The method and form of such a school system is left largely to the discre-
tion of the General Assembly, but the school system may not be utterly
abolished by the legislature. Otherwise the control of the General Assembly
is supreme over the legal status of local specialized governmental units.
Thus, with the exception noted, the General Assembly may freely create,
alter, or abolish special districts.
Conclusion
The legal status of special purpose local units gives rise to two general
observations. First, the effect of the establishment of special districts may
be to disorient the citizen-taxpayer. For example, it is almost a certainty
that a citizen could not begin to trace the boundary line of an airport
authority which his tax money supports. His comprehension of the geog-
raphy and the functions of such a local unit as an airport authority is thus
greatly limited. On the other hand, his knowledge of the size and boundary
of his county or village is apt to be much more exact. He can at least, if
he chooses, find such boundaries on most up-to-date road maps. Generally,
the citizen is in effect disassociated from the special local unit, with a result-
ing attitude of indifference on his part toward the conduct of its affairs.
The second general observation suggested by the legal entity of special
purpose districts has to do with local control. The special districts gen-
erally tend to be bigger than the traditional city, and in some cases county
and township, units. The reason in large measure probably is economic. A
village may not be able to afford to have its own library, but if the number
53
of taxpayers can be increased to a number sufficient to support such a
venture by enlarging the territory of the Hbrary district, then the village will
have its library. However, the village gives up exclusive control of the
government of the libraiy and agrees to abide by the rule of the majority
of the electors in the specially created district, a large number of whom may
know nothing of the needs and affairs of the village involved.
Whether the loss by a citizen of a high degree of association with and
control over special units is or is not desirable is not the subject of this
paper. The role of local government in perpetuating democratic institutions
has been suggested in the opening paper. It is increasingly apparent that
special purpose units, in a legal sense, are here to stay and will continue to
increase. In terms of legal status, the legislature with but few exceptions
is in the enviable position of being able to create, combine, alter, or abolish
all local governmental units. Only practical policy considerations limit this
authority of the Illinois General Assembly.
II
THE HOME RULE EXPERIENCE'
ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE COMMITTEE ON HOME RULE
Illinois municipalities, working through their Municipal League, have
been increasingly successful in the last few years in expanding the scope of
activities permitted cities and villages and in limiting the imposition of
restrictions and requirements on cities and villages. The most important
manifestations of this success are seen in the permissive sales and utility
taxes and in the veto of legislation requiring minimum salary payments to
certain classes of municipal employees. It remains our unshaken belief that
wages and working conditions of municipal employees are matters for local
negotiation and determination.
In commending this recent liberal state action, the League has con-
sistently characterized it as action "in support of the home-rule pi'inciple."
By so doing, the Illinois Municipal League has demonstrated its awareness
of the fact that home rule is not a black or white affair. We have ap-
proached it as a kind of philosophy of government whereby state officials
tend to restrain themselves from imposing requirements or restrictions on
'
Reprinted from Report of the Illinois Municipal League Committee on Home
Rule, approved by the Executive Committee of the Illinois Municipal League, August
31, 1956, pp. 6-12.
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municipal governments and tend to maximize the freedom of choice granted
municipal governments in making policy decisions. Every decision affect-
ing municipal government that is made by the state legislature or by the
governor accepts or rejects that philosophy, depending on how great a
conflict there is between the interests of the municipalities and the interests
of other groups in the state. We recognize that other groups have legitimate
interests which may conflict with those of the cities and villages and that
the role of the state is to resolve those conflicts.
We have considered municipal objectives in four major areas with a
view to assessing the present adequacy of local freedom of choice and the
likelihood of state-imposed restrictions on such freedom. Our "home-rule"
legislative objectives flow logically from this assessment.
1. The structure and form of municipal government. Local freedom of
choice is at a high level in this field. Illinois municipalities, other than
Chicago, may organize under any of the four popular forms of municipal
government— aldermanic, village, commission, or manager
—• and may
change from one foiTn to another at the will of the voters. The enabling
legislation in each case is generally liberal; the General Assembly has shown
no reluctance to respond to requests for needed amendments and
improvements.
An improvement favored by the Committee is legislation authorizing
the mayors and presidents of non-manager cities and villages to delegate
limited administrative authority to a professional assistant. A relatively
minor problem in the Committee's consideration of the state-local relation-
ship in the area of structure and form of city government was some dissatis-
faction with state-imposed limits on salaries of certain city officials. We
are confident that ordinary legislation can improve this situation and see no
reason to feel that "home rule" either is seriously lacking in this area or is
likely to be expanded by constitutional amendment.
2. Service powers of mu?iicipal governments. The multiplicity of local
units of government and Illinois' large variety of special districts cut sig-
nificahtly into the service powers required by Illinois cities and villages.
The local governments concerned with services which are not provided by
cities and villages (e.g., school districts, park districts, sanitary districts) will
not benefit from an expansion of city and village home-rule powers. The
cities and villages themselves do not now appear to be anxious for an
expansion of powers in the service field, although we firmly oppose any
lessening of such powers.
The record of those cities in other states "enjoying" constitutional home
rule in the area of service powers would not justify any major effort to
achieve such status for Illinois cities even if the numerous special districts
did not virtually pre-empt the service area. State courts interpreting con-
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stitutional home-rule provisions have declared such important service func-
tions as education, public housing, public utilities, and public health to be
matters of state concern rather than local or municipal affairs and, there-
fore, within the continuing control of the state legislature. For example, in
New York the courts have held that public education is essentially a state
and not a city function and that the state's education law is controlling in
case of conflict with a city charter.
The public housing field, although not a matter of special concern to
downstate Illinois municipalities, furnishes an important clue to the scope
of municipal service powers in as model a constitutional home-rule state
as Colorado. The Supreme Court of Colorado has held that the state
legislature was not foreclosed from creating a housing authority for Denver,
despite the fact that the city was operating under a constitutional home-rule
charter which, by express constitutional provision, is supposed to supersede
state law in local and municipal matters.
Neither the public utility nor public health service functions would be
subject to increased local control by the adoption of constitutional home rule
in this state. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the creation of the
Illinois Commerce Commission removed from municipalities all regulatory
power over the instrumentalities of a public utility or the public utility
business. In the considered judgment of the Chicago Home Rule Commis-
sion expert staff, "A constitutional grant of home-rule . . . would probably
not disturb the dominance of the State so clearly established in this field."^
In the public health service area, constitutional home rule was of no
avail in Juneau, Wisconsin, when the State of Wisconsin ordered the city
to provide a sewage treatment system. The language of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court made short shrift of Wisconsin's home-rule provision:
While it is provided by section 3 of the same article, that cities and villages or-
ganized pursuant to State law are empowered to determine their local affairs and
government subject only to the constitution and such enactments of the legislature of
State-wide concern, there can be no question that the promotion of a protection of
public health is a matter of State-wide concern.^
In summary, we find no important service powers which Illinois cities
are disabled from performing by the absence of constitutional home rule,
and we are pessimistic, on the basis of experience elsewhere, about the
possibility of liberalization even if there were service powers which we feel
we should exercise but now can not.
3. Police powers of municipal governments. Existing statutory grants
'
Chicago's Government: Its Structural Modernization and Home Rule Prob-
lems, report of the Chicago Home Rule Commission, 1954, p. 259. Also published
as Chicago Home Rule Commission, Modernizing a City Government (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1954).
* State ex rel. Martin v. Juneau, 238 Wis. 564, 571 (1941).
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provide Illinois cities and villages with a substantial measure of police
power— that is, power to enact laws for the promotion of the health,
comfort, safety, morals, and welfare of their residents. The Chicago Home
Rule Commission analysis concluded that it is "difficult to find any major
area of municipal concern in the exercise of its police-power functions for
which statutory authorization has not been given."^ The major impediment
to free municipal activity in the police-power field has not been legislative
or gubernatorial reluctance to grant power, but rather the tendency of the
courts to construe such power very strictly, because of the inevitable clash
between exercise of the police power and constitutional guarantee of due
process and equal protection of the laws. A narrow view has been taken
of broad, undefined delegations of police power, and where there is any
reasonable doubt concerning the particular application of such broad
delegations, the doubt will often be resolved against the municipality.
Unhappily, however, this is again a deficiency in municipal powers for
which constitutional home rule is not a specific. Consider, for example, the
New York Multiple Dwelling Law, enacted by the state legislature and, by
population classification, applicable only to New York City. The law dealt
with the problems of tenements and the prevention of unsanitary and
dangerous living conditions, plainly a proper subject of police-power legis-
lation. Under the home-rule section of the New York Constitution, if the
subject matter dealt with the "property, affairs or government" of the city,
the legislature should not have been able to act without a request from New
York City's mayor and council. No such request had been made. Never-
theless, the New York Supreme Court sustained the act, holding that it
dealt with a matter of state concern and was therefore beyond the limita-
tions of the home-rule amendment.*' Although this decision is more than
twenty-five years old, it has been characterized recently as "a blow . . .
from which home rule has never recovered."'
Experiences in the exercise of municipal police powers in other consti-
tutional home-rule states are not much more encouraging. Despite ap-
parently generous home-rule grants, the police power has been sharply
curtailed in Oklahoma, California, Ohio, and Missouri. The conclusion
seems inescapable that in this area of municipal activity, as in the field of
service powers, constitutional home rule in and of itself, no matter how
carefully drawn, will not do the job that seems necessary.
In the view of the Committee, the police-power job that seems necessary
and for which authority is presently lacking is in the field of licensing for
regulation (as distinguished from licensing for revenue). An inability to
^
Chicago's Government, op. cit., pp. 266-267.
" Adler V. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467 (1929).
' W. Bernard Richland, "Constitutional City Home Rule in New York," Colum-
bia Law Review, LIV (1954), 311, 329.
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secure such power has been the major municipal difficulty in the police-
power area. The Illinois courts apply a strict construction of legislative
intent in the police-power field, a point noted above. The consequence
appears to be a need to spell out each business or occupation which may
be subjected to regulatory licensing. For example, statutory authority to
regulate dealers in "junk, rags, and any secondhand articles whatsoever"
has been construed to exclude power to regulate dealers in secondhand
motor vehicles, trailers, tires, and parts. Secondhand stores of many kinds,
certain appliance-repair services, and a limited number of other businesses
would be licensed, strictly for regulation, by many Illinois municipalities if
they had the power to do so. We think it is important that such power be
granted, but we are doubtful that any generalized kind of grant will achieve
the objective.
4. Revenue powers of municipal governments. There is no question but
that the action of the Illinois legislature in its 1955 session in granting
authority to cities and villages to impose a one-half-cent sales tax without
referendum and to impose a consumers' utility tax represented a significant
forward step in the home-rule movement. It should be understood, how-
ever, that although these sources, when added to other available revenue
sources like the wheel tax and amusement tax, ameliorate the municipal
revenue problem, they do not answer the need for home rule in the revenue
field. Home rule in revenue requires the elimination of tax rate limits
and an opportunity for municipalities to choose between broad-based
non-property taxes. Despite the success of the municipal sales tax— a
success that is admitted by its most vehement opponents— some of our
cities would be better off if they could impose a low flat-rate tax on income
and eliminate the sales tax. We are not now arguing for such a tax, but
rather are taking our stand with those members of the Illinois Legislative
Commission on Municipal Revenue who, in 1953, said that such choice
constituted home rule and that "Home rule of this kind is the essence of
decentralized, representative government."^
An appropriate inquiry in the revenue field, as in the areas of form
and structure of government, police powers, and service powers, is whether
a constitutional grant of home rule is a useful technique to minimize state
control and maximize local authority over municipal revenue policy. With
the exception of California, broad municipal autonomy in the tax area has
not been sustained consistently in any of the constitutional or legislative
home-rule states. Admittedly, the liberal approach in California, where
municipal taxation has been deemed a matter of municipal concern, has
made it possible for California cities to levy a variety of business, occupa-
*
"Minority Report," Municipal Revenue Problems, report of the Illinois Legis-
lative Commission on Municipal Revenue, 1953, p. 32.
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tional, privilege, and excise taxes. In such celebrated home-rule states as
New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Michigan, West Virginia, and Oklahoma,
municipal revenue autonomy does not exist. Rather, the taxing power of
cities and villages is circumscribed either by the need for specific legislative
authority to enact a particular tax, by the power of the legislature to
pre-empt a tax field, or by the power of the legislature to restrict or deny
the imposition of a tax by a municipality.
Professor Jefferson Fordham, one of the handful of real legal authorities
in the home-rule field, finds little cause of encouragement in considering
constitutional home rule and municipal revenue:
Without financial independence, it is a question whether high sounding grants
of home rule powers are very meaningful. Yet, it is in this very area that home rule
municipalities enjoy least advantage. They are usually subject to constitutional or
statutory property tax and debt limits. The property tax is still, with some exceptions,
their chief source of revenue. Generally speaking, moreover, it cannot be said that
there is wide municipal freedom in imposing excises.^
Writing in the Northwestern University Law Review during the period
of this Committee's study. Professor Rubin G. Cohn reached a similar
conclusion :
In almost every state in which constitutional provisions express some form of
municipal home rule, the reservation of legislative control over municipal revenues
belies the concept of local autonomy, making illusory the political idealistic concep-
tion of home rule. Until a reconciliation is effected which bridges or narrows this
gap between the political ideal and the constitutional reality, muncipal autonomy in
revenue will depend largely upon legislative grace."
In short, it appears to be the judgment of informed specialists, con-
firmed by our consideration of the evidence, that constitutional home rule,
as traditionally understood, is likely to have litde impact on Illinois mu-
nicipal revenue problems. There is a good likelihood of the adoption of
a pre-emption doctrine or of explicit or implicit reservations of legislative
power to restrict or amend exercise of municipal autonomy in the revenue
field. As a consequence, we can not recommend, as an appropriate way to
safeguard recent revenue gains or to extend local freedom, support for a
constitutional amendment which makes broad grants of power to municipal
governments.
"Jefferson B. Fordham, Local Government Law (Brooklyn, N.Y. : Foundation
Press, Inc., 1949), p. 101.
"^ Rubin G. Cohn, "Municipal Revenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional
Home Rule," Northwestern University Law Review, LI ( March-April, 1956), 29.
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MUNICIPAL SERVICES IN ILLINOIS
CHARLES M. KNEIER
People living in urban areas have felt a need for governmental services
which are not provided by the state, the county, the township, special
districts, or any other unit of government. This accounts in large part for
the incorporation of cities and villages with po\ver to meet the special
problems which arise in urban areas or the problems which may be found
in rural areas but are presented in an accentuated form in urban areas.
Rather than entrust these services to other existing units of government,
cities are created. This places the making of decisions in the hands of
representatives of the people directly concerned and permits a grass-roots
approach to the problem of municipal services.
In determining whether a service should be rendered by local govern-
ment and, if it should be, by which unit (county, township, city, special
district, etc.) it should be rendered, there are factors to be considered other
than efficiency and economy in the performance of the service. Among the
factors to be considered are obtaining maximum participation in govern-
ment and assuring the people an opportunity to determine whether a
service should be performed and how it shall be done. The resistance at the
local level to consolidation, simplification, or elimination of some units of
local government has shown that voters are interested in factors other than
mere economy or efficiency in the performance of services.
Legal Aspects of Municipal Services
Illinois cities may undertake functions and render services only as they
have been authorized to do so by the state. Power is conferred not by
constitutional provision, but by acts of the General Assembly. As stated by
the Supreme Court of Illinois, ". . . cities in this State have no inherent
powers but only such as are delegated to them by law and such as are
necessarily incident to those granted, and a delegation of power will be
strictly construed."^ And the court has emphasized by frequent restatement
that ". . . it is thoroughly established that municipal corporations, being
creatures of the statute, have no inherent powers. . . ."^ City officials must
look to the statutes for a grant of power authorizing a proposed new service
or function. If the power has not been granted, the performance of the
service will not be sustained by the courts.
'Ambassador East, Inc. v. Chicago, 399 111. 359 (1948).
=
Chicago V. Cuda, 403 III. 381 (1949).
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Pressure Groups and Services
In considering whether a service should be rendered, city officials may
find they are faced with conflicting interests and pressures. There may be
some groups who are interested primarily in keeping the tax rate low, even
though it means less services. Other groups are interested in having the city
government undertake a new service which will be of particular value or
interest to them. A group interested in downtown business may want off-
street parking lots to prevent the development of suburban shopping centers ;
a parents' organization may want flashers and crossing guards for the
safety of children; another group may seek a new or improved recreation
program; and another may want a "small appropriation" for a commission
on human relations. Members of groups seeking new municipal services are
usually also interested in keeping the tax rate down and, if they do not
actually oppose, often have little enthusiasm for the new services sought by
other groups.
Classification of Municipal Services
Municipal governments provide for their citizens' goods and activities,
such as police and fire protection, streets, recreation programs, and water
from a municipally owned plant. This is what we usually have in mind
when we refer to municipal services. Regulations which restrict or limit
the activity of some part of the municipal population as a means of promot-
ing the general welfare may also be looked upon as a service. Licensing of
taxicabs, taverns, and other businesses, with conditions attached to the grant
relative to the way the business is to be conducted, is a service of this type.
The objective in both cases is to making living in urban areas more
desirable.
Municipal services (or regulations) may be placed in three classes:
1. Those services (or regulations) about which there is general agree-
ment that they should be performed by and through city governments.
Police and fire protection, the maintenance of streets, and the regulation of
traffic are in this group. As urban areas reach a certain point in population
growth, the desirability of, if not the necessity for, services in this group
becomes apparent. There is little or no choice on the part of the residents
of the city or of city officials as to whether such services should be rendered.
Rather, the choice in these cases is one of the standard or level of
performance.
2. Those services (or regulations) about which there is no general
agreement, but which are usually provided by the city. Municipal water
supplies and recreation programs are illustrative.
3. Those services (or regulations) which are unusual in that they are
found in only a small minority of cities and, when proposed, are usually
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the subject of heated discussion and need to be justified to the citizens.
Human relations councils, municipal radio broadcasting stations, and finan-
cial aid to attract industry are in this category.
Obviously all services (or regulations) do not neatly fall into one of
these categories. Municipal ownership is illustrative. While municipal
ownership of water is commonly accepted in Illinois, only four cities own
their electric plants. Such a classification may be helpful, however, in
considering whether services should be expanded by upward mobility in the
three classes: from the unusual to the commonly accepted, or from the
commonly accepted to consensus or general agreement. And if such upward
mobility is desirable, should city officials assume the responsibility of leading
public opinion in this direction?
Current Problems in the Field of Services
No attempt will be made to survey all municipal services. The discussion
will be limited to those services where questions as to whether they should
be performed are involved, or where there is a policy question as to the
method of performance.
An old issue in American local government, and one which still con-
tinues, is whether cities should own the public utilities. Extensive power
of municipal ownership of public utilities has been conferred upon Illinois
cities. The question is presented as to whether the city should depend upon
privately owned utilities with regulation by the Illinois Commerce Com-
mission, or whether it should provide the service directly through a munic-
ipal plant. The arguments for and against municipal ownership are beyond
the space limitations of this paper. What should be done generally depends
on the city, on the satisfaction with the services and rates of the privately
owned utility, on the degree of cooperation between the city and the utility,
and especially on the type of utility. As Table 7 indicates, municipal
ownership of water supply has been generally accepted as a proper munic-
ipal service in this state. In 92 per cent of the municipalities having a
public (citywide) water supply, it is municipally owned.
Only four cities own their electric plants: Bloomington, Bushnell, Jack-
sonville, and Springfield. In all four cases there is a competing privately
owned utility. The small number of cities owning electric plants may be a
result in part of the argument that a city has not been found to be an
economic unit for the generation of power. Generation at a few central
points and distribution to cities over a wide area are pointed to as the most
economical method of generation. An attempt has been made in some states
to meet this problem by passing enabling legislation for the creation of
public power districts. Several cities can then be served from one central
generating plant, with distribution a function of either the power district
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TABLE 7. SOURCE OF WATER SUPPLY IN ILLINOIS MUNICIPALITIES"
Source of Supply Number
Total number with public supplies 912
Supplies privately owned 75
Supplies municipally owned 837
Supplied by other municipalities (total) 158
Supplied by Chicago 55
Supplied by East St. Louis 16
Supplied by another municipality 87
^ Source: Data on Public Water Supplies in Incorporated Muncipalities, Department of Public
Health, State of Illinois, 1955; Addendum No. 1, July 1, 1960.
or the city. If the latter, then the city purchases its power from the pubhc
power district serving its area.
In the case of most pubHc utiHties, municipal ownership presents a
problem of policy. There is, however, a question as to whether in many
cities municipal ownership of a system of mass transportation will not be-
come one of necessity if public transportation is to be available. Rather than
a question of municipal versus private ownership, it becomes a question of
publicly owned public transportation or none. In an increasing number of
cities, private companies are finding public transportation will not pay
expenses of operation and a fair return on the investment. The issue seems
to be whether the city government will do nothing and let service come to
an end, or will feel this is a necessary service for which it has a responsibility.
If the city government does accept the position that public transporta-
tion is so essential that the city should assume the responsibility of seeing
that it is continued when private enterprise finds it can not be made a
profitable venture, what are the alternatives? One would be municipal
ownership and operation of the bus lines at a rate the traffic will bear.
Any losses would be met out of general revenues. Another alternative
would be to continue private operation with a subsidy from the city. It has
been suggested that cities contract with the private bus companies for
operation on a mileage basis. If fares did not meet this agreed-upon
mileage cost, then the city would pay the difference to the company. Under
such a plan the city government would fix the fares of the bus company
and specify the routes, the frequency of runs, and other standards of
service— questions now under the jurisdiction of the Illinois Commerce
Commission. This approach to the problem of bus services would require
new legislation by the General Assembly.^
^ Attention might be directed to the Illinois statute which provides that "Any
city of this State may contribute such sums of money toward erecting, building, main-
taining and supporting any non-sectarian public hospital located within its limits as
the city council shall deem proper." ///. Rev. Stat., 1959, Ch. 24, sec. 45-1.
63
Statutory authorization has been made to local governments to own
and operate airports. The argument can be advanced, and has been suc-
cessfully advanced, that a service which local governments can and should
render is to provide adequate airport facilities. The importance of having
air travel facilities in cities is compared with the advantage cities had
earlier of being "on a railroad." That local governments have taken ad-
vantage of the statutory grant of power is shown by the fact that as of
October, 1960, there were in Illinois twenty airport authorities; twenty-
three airports; five county airports under the General Act and two under
the Airport Act; two under park districts; and one under a port district—
a total of fifty-three public airports.*
Under statutory grants of power, cities may establish municipal hospitals.
Where private initiative has not met the problem of adequate hospital
facilities, there is an opportunity for the city government to provide an
essential service (see Table 8).
The part to be played by city government, or the service to be rendered,
in the disposal of garbage and other wastes presents a problem of policy.
Sewage disposal has been accepted as a responsibility of local governments,
either the city or a special district. In most cases this is financed by taxation,
but in some cities a sewage charge is made.
Small cities and villages may do nothing about the garbage problem, but
as the population grows, municipal action becomes necessary. Some cities
in this country meet the problem by licensing private sanitary haulers, laying
down requirements as to the standards of sanitation to be observed by these
persons, and providing public dumping grounds. A charge for the license
is often made, the proceeds being used to cover the cost of enforcement of
the ordinance and the maintenance of the dumping grounds. Some cities
maintain incinerators for disposal of the garbage rather than depending on
dumping.
TABLE 8. HOSPITALS OWNED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN ILLINOIS"
Local Government Unit Number Owning Hospitals
City 16b
County 25
Hospital District 18
Sanitarium District 1
Township 3
* Source: 1960-1961 Directory of Hospitals and Accredited Schools of Nursing, Department of
Public Health, State of Illinois, Springfield, 1960.
*> Beardstown, Champaign, Chicago (one contagious diseases and one tuberculosis), Clinton,
DeKalb, Marion, Moline, Monmouth, Ottawa, Peoria (TB), Princeton, Rochelle, Rockford (TB),
Savanna, Sterling, and Sycamore.
*
Airport Owning Municipalities, Illinois Department of Aeronautics, Springfield,
1960.
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Other cities provide this service directly. They maintain a fleet of
trucks and use municipal employees, and the householder deals with and
pays the city for this service, either in the form of taxes or as a service
charge. Some cities also consider garbage disposal a proper municipal
service but let a contract to one individual or company to perform the
service. The contract price is then paid by the city out of tax revenues.
These cities, whether the service is rendered directly through municipal
employees or indirectly through a contractor, believe that the total cost to
the residents of the city is less where there is one collecting agency. They
consider collection by competing private carriers, with the duplication of
facilities, as not being the most economical plan of meeting this problem.
They also believe the problem of maintaining proper standards of sanita-
tion (cleanliness of trucks, littering of streets with garbage falling from
trucks, etc.) is simplified. Clearly, here is a question of policy in providing
a service.
Air pollution and fluoridation are two current problems in the field of
public health. The prevention of air pollution is a service which is being
undertaken to an increasing degree by American cities.^ Smoke control
ordinances have been upheld in Illinois where the court found them to be
reasonable; ordinances which the court considered to be arbitrary and
unreasonable have been held to be unconstitutional.^
There are those who believe that fumes from automobiles contribute to
the air pollution problem and that some form of government control may
become desirable or essential in the future. If this is thought desirable,
then the method of control and the level of government at which it should
be exercised become important.
An effort was made to meet the smog problem at the 1960 session of the
California legislature. The act requires the installation of devices on all
cars throughout the state, but counties may exclude themselves from the
provisions of the act. This is done by the Board of Supervisors if it is
established at a public hearing that there is no air pollution problem in that
county. The law sets up a timetable for installation of devices measured
from the day the State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board, which is
in the State Department of Public Health, certifies that it has issued cer-
tificates of approval for two or more devices.
If the exhaust fumes from motor vehicles in Illinois cities ever become
a sufficiently serious problem to require government action, then the ques-
^ On the problem of air pollution, see Metropolitan Area Services, second report
of the Northeastern Illinois Metropolitan Area Local Governmental Services Com-
mission (Urbana: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois,
1959), pp. 24-29.
^Kankakee v. New York Central Railroad Company, 387 111. 109 (1944);
Harmon v. Chicago, 110 111. 400 (1884). Also see Northwestern Laundry v. Des
Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916).
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tion as to state and local responsibility must be met. Is it a problem for
state or local action, or for joint and cooperative action of the state and
local governments? A new statutory grant of power may be needed to
enable local governments to cope with the problem.
Where there are several adjoining cities, can the smoke problem be
effectively met by the separate action of each? If not, is cooperative action
the answer, and are the statutes adequate? Or can this problem be met
most effectively by the creation of a smoke abatement district covering a
group of adjoining cities, and should the statutes be amended to provide for
this as an optional approach?
The fluoridation of water indicates the need for city officials to have
under continued study and consideration the question of new services or
improvement in existing services. It also illustrates the conflicting pressures
brought on city officials when a decision is made as to a new service. This
question has generated bitter debate in many cities involving the value of
fluoridation and the question of interference with the religious beliefs of
certain groups.
The advantages of having a city plan to direct the orderly growth of
the city in the future and to remedy some of the defects of the past are
generally accepted. And controlling the use of private property through a
zoning ordinance has also been accepted as a desirable service which city
governments can render. Some cities have failed, however, to take ad-
vantage of the statutory grants of power relative to city planning and
zoning. A complaint made against some cities is that they have a city plan
in the paper stage but that it has not been implemented or put into effect;
another complaint is that in actual administration there are so many
exceptions made to the zoning ordinance and so many variations granted
that it becomes meaningless. Statutory grants of power have been made,
to cities and villages in Illinois for city planning and zoning.'^
Closely related to city planning is the problem of subdivision control.*
Is there a service to be rendered by exercising control over new subdivisions,
regulating the acts of the subdivider so as to prevent action on his part which
may require costly remedial action in the future? Statutory authority has
been granted to cities having planning commissions to exercise control over
subdivision development within the city and for one and one-half miles
beyond the corporate limits. Whether the grant is adequate and whether
'
III. Rev. Stat., 1959, Ch. 24, Arts. 30, 53 and 73.
' The adequacy of the statutes on this point was considered in the first report of
the Cities and Villages Municipal Problems Commission (1959). For statutes on the
point see ///. Rev. Stat., 1959, Ch. 24, Art. 53; for control by counties over sub-
division control outside cities, villages and towns see ///. Rev. Stat., 1959, Ch. 34,
sees. 414-415.
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adequate use has been made of the powers granted can be answered only
on the basis of a study of the experience of cities in this field.
The General Assembly has granted authority for local low-cost housing
programs, slum clearance, and urban redevelopment. A separate chapter
of the Illinois statutes is devoted to "Housing and Redevelopment," with
provisions for the creation by cities of over 25,000 or by counties of housing
authorities'^ and for cooperation of municipal corporations with such hous-
ing authorities and the federal government.^" Among the statutory grants
on slum clearance are the Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act of 1947; the
Blighted Vacant Areas Development Act of 1949; the act for the Conser-
vation of Urban Residential Areas of 1953; and the Neighborhood Re-
development Corporation Law of 1941.^^ Clearly there is statutory author-
ization for action and through such action for service. Twenty-one local
housing authorities have been established in Illinois; five of these are city
authorities and sixteen are county.
^^
Officials in some cities are being presented with the problem of new
shopping centers being developed beyond their borders, with a resulting
loss of business by merchants in the central city. Is there a responsibility
on the part of the city government to take action and render new services
which may check the movement of city shoppers to the suburban shopping
center? It is believed that one of the attractions of the suburban shopping
center is the fact that adequate parking facilities are available so that down-
town traffic congestion can be avoided. One way in which cities have
attempted to meet this challenge, and to save business for the merchants
who through taxes support the city government, is to provide off-street
parking facilities, and through city planning to improve traffic conditions
in the city.^^ Thus, at the same time, the city government is rendering
a service to both shopper and merchant.
Through recreation programs cities have been meeting the problems
presented by the increase in leisure time available to their citizens. Acting
under statutory grants of power, they are providing supervised and directed
recreation programs under trained personnel. Statutory provision is made
for recreation programs under city or park district control.^* In this general
'III. Rev. Stat., 1959, Ch. 67'/2, sees, l-27e.
'°Ill. Rev. Stat., 1959, Ch. 67'/2, sees. 28-34.
"//;. Rev. Stat., 1959, Ch. GTVi, sees. 64-95. Also see Ch. 24, sec. 23-103.1 for
statutory authorization to municipalities to acquire property which is "necessary or
appropriate for the rehabilitation or redevelopment of any blighted or slum area."
'^ As of July 27, 1960, information supplied by Public Housing Administration,
Housing and Home Finance Agency, Chicago.
" For statutory authority to provide off-street parking facilities see ///. Rev. Stat.,
1959, Ch. 24, Art. 52.1.
"///. Rev. Stat., 1959, Ch. 24, sees. 57-1 to 10; Ch. 105, sec. 8-10. The Depart-
ment of Recreation, University of Illinois, reports that as of November, 1960, "there
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area of leisure-time or recreation activities, services or programs for which
there is statutory- authorization include coliseums for "general educational
and amusement purposes," community buildings, convention halls, harbors
for "recreational use and benefit of the public," swimming pools, stadiums,
recreation centers, and the maintenance or employ-ment of a municipal
band for musical purposes.^^ And cities have been authorized to create Art
Commissions to approve works of art erected on public property'.
16
Regulation of Conduct
It has been said that one of the disadvantages of living in a cit^- is that
by government action the freedom of choice of the individual is more
limited than in a nonurban area. Such action on the part of government
is highly desirable in many cases and necessar)' in others. The personal
conduct of the individual and the use to which he puts his propert)' become
matters of common interest and result in government action. Building
codes, zoning ordinances, compulsory- connection with sewers, and the way
in which garbage is disposed of are illustrative. Regulating and limiting
the conduct of the individual in furtherance of the general welfare become
essential services in cities.
The problem of policy involved here is determining how far to go.
Some citizens may complain because their city government fails to prohibit
the keeping of cows or pigs in the city, or the conducting of a business in a
residential section which depreciates their propert\- values or makes living
conditions undesirable. Other citizens complain that cities go too far in
regulating the conduct of the individual. Censorship and the regulation of
morals are frequently criticized as going too far in this direction.
One method used by cities to promote the general welfare is to use the
licensing power to control the action of individuals engaged in certain types
of business. By licensing and attaching conditions to the grant, such as no
sale of liquor to minors by taverns, with the threat of suspension or revoca-
tion for violation of the conditions, cities and villages have available an
effective method of control. Prohibition of certain action, such as the sale
of liquor to a minor, with threat of a fine if found guilty of a violation,
is considered to be less effective than the threat of suspension or revocation
of a liquor license.
Cities, villages, and towTis have been expressly granted by statute exten-
are, as near as we have been able to determine, 94 municipalities in the State pro-
viding full-time, year-round, recreation program services with tax funds derived from
special levies as provided by enabling laws within the Cities and Villages Act and the
Park District Code."
"III. Rev. Stat., 1959, Ch. 24, sees. 26-1 to 15, Ch. 24, sec. 32-1; Ch. 24, sees.
34-1 to 9: Ch. 24, Art. 41.1 : Ch. 24, Art. 50; Ch. 24, Art. 57; Ch. 24, Art. 64.
''III. Rev. Stat., 1959, Ch. 24, .Art. 25.
68
sive power to license.^^ The specific statutor)' grants of power to license
give only a part of the picture. Other statutes grant extensive power to
cities and villages to regulate, and the courts have held that "the power to
regulate includes the power to license"^^ if the courts consider it a reason-
able means of regulation in the particular case/^ Municipal corporations
thus have available, either by express grant or by imphcation, extensive
licensing powers which may be used to promote the general welfare.
Another advantage cities find in the use of the licensing power as a
method of control is that a charge may be made and the cost passed on to
the persons licensed. And if the statutory grant includes the power to tax
as well as to license, then licensing may be used to raise revenue.
Emerging Services
Is the attraction of new industries a proper function or service of a
municipal government? Or is this a matter that should be left to the
Chamber of Commerce or another nongovernmental organization? Those
who believe this should be left to private organizations take the position
that the public responsibility' ends, insofar as goverrmient action is con-
cerned, when adequate public services (police, fire, streets, etc.) are pro-
vided. At least eight states permit their local governments to issue bonds to
construct plants for lease to manufacturers. In other states, cities carr\- on
promotional campaigns to attract industry'. And seven states permit local
^' For the statutor)' grant of power to cities, villages, and incorporated towns to
license see ///. Rev. Stat. (1959), as follows: Alcoholic liquor, Ch. 43, sec. 110;
.\thletic contests, Ch. 24, sec. 23-55; Auctioneers, private detectives, money changers,
bankers, brokers, barbers, lumber yards and lumber storehouses, liver\- stables, public
scales, ice cream parlors, coffee houses, florists, detective agencies, and barber shops,
Ch. 24, sec. 23-91: Carnivals, Ch. 38, sec. 121c; Coin-operated amusement devices,
Ch. 120, sec. 481b. 7; Eating or amusement places, Ch. 24, sec. 23-54; Fire, salvage,
and closing out sales, Ch. 121 '2, sec. 149-150; Hackmen, dra^-men, omnibus driv-
ers, carters, cabmen, porters, and expressmen, Ch. 24, sec. 23-51: Hawkers, peddlers,
pawnbrokers, itinerant merchants, transient vendors of merchandise, theatricals and
other exhibitions, shows, and amusements, Ch. 24, sec. 23-54; Hospitals, Ch. IIII2,
sec. 145; Junk dealers, Ch. 24, sec. 23-94; Mason contractors and employing masons
(cities of 150,000 population or overl, Ch. 24, sec. 22-43; Motor vehicles, Ch. 95':,
sec. 32a; Pin ball or bowling alleys, billiard, bagatelle, pigeon-hole, pool, or any other
tables or implements kept for a similar purpose in any place of public resort, Ch. 24,
sec. 23-56; Plumbers (cities of 500,000 population or over), Ch. 24, sec. 22-49,
and Ch. lUVi, sec. 116.50; Rooming houses (cities of 500,000 or less), Ch. 24, sec.
23-87.1; Steam boiler and elevator operators, Ch. 24, sec. 23-77; Runners for cabs,
busses, railroads, ships, hotels, public houses, Ch. 24, sec. 23-52 ; Street advertising,
Ch. 24, sec. 23-22; Vehicles conveying loads within the municipalitv-, Ch. 24, sees.
23-53, 671: Water craft, Ch. 24, sec. 23-45.
''American Baking Co. v. Wilmington, 370 111. 400, 403, 19 X.E. 2d 172, 174
(1938). Statutory- grants of power "to regulate the sale of" and "to regulate the
inspection of have been held to support licensing. Gundling v. Chicago, 176 111.
340, 52 X.E. 44 (1898).
"Wilkie v. Chicago, 188 111. 444, 58 X.E. 1004 (1900): Father Basil's Lodge,
Inc. v. Chicago, 393 111. 246, 65 X.E. 2d 805 (1946).
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governments to exempt for a period of five to ten years new industries
locating within their borders.
At the 1951 session of the Illinois General Assembly, an act was passed
authorizing any municipality, after referendum approval, to issue revenue
bonds to finance the construction of industrial buildings for lease or sale.
As stated in the act, its purpose "is to relieve conditions of unemployment"
and "to encourage the increase of industry within this State, thereby reduc-
ing the evils attendant upon unemployment."-*^
What, if anything, can or should cities and villages in this state do to
promote understanding, harmony, and good will between different racial
and religious groups? Is this a service that should be undertaken by city
governments? By 1960, thirteen Illinois cities had created municipal human
relations councils by ordinance, with limited financial support from the
city in a few of them.-^ The experience in these cities may indicate another
avenue of service for local governments in this state.
One of the objectives of such commissions is to end, or at least reduce,
discrimination against Negroes in employment. The only method they have
to obtain their objective is persuasion and cooperation on the part of
employers.
In 1950, Gary, Indiana, enacted an ordinance creating a Fair Em-
ployment Practice Commission with power of enforcement. The ordinance
prohibits unfair employment practices and declares it to be such a practice
"For any employer, because of race, color, religion, age, national origin or
ancestry of any individual, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate
against him with respect to hire, tenure, promotions, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment or any matter directly or indirectly related to
employment." The penalty for violation of any provisions of the ordinance
or for persons who shall fail, refuse, or neglect to comply with any decision
of the Gary Fair Employment Practice Commission is a fine. Prosecutions
under the ordinance are brought by the city attorney, but "only after
certification of a case to him by the Commission." If Illinois cities wanted
to undertake such a program, it seems that a statutory grant of power
would be desirable if not essential.
Liquor stores are now owned and operated by cities in some states.
This activity may be defended on the ground that, with the profit motive
removed, the law enforcement problem resulting from the sale of liquor
will be reduced. And any profit from the business will go to the city to be
used to finance law enforcement problems resulting from the sale of liquor.
'"III. Rev. Stat., 1959, Ch. 24, sees. 1211-1244.
" Bruce B. Mason, "Municipal Human Relations Councils," Illinois Government,
Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, Urbana, February,
1960; Illinois Comm.ission on Human Relations, Documents Pertaining to Municipal
Human Relations Commissions in Illinois (April, 1960).
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Is this going too far? If not, then where is the Hne to be drawn between
municipal and private ownership of the means of distribution of other
goods ?
These are illustrative of class-three services (or regulations) referred to
earlier in this discussion. They are found in only a small minority of cities.
Will they or others in this group advance at some future time to category
two, the services usually provided by cities? Or will they go in the other
direction and be abandoned entirely as appropriate municipal services?
A Look Ahead
There is always the question as to whether cities generally, or a par-
ticular city, are making adequate use of statutory grants of power. Obvi-
ously, all cities will not make full use of all grants of power to render
service. A liberal program of service, however, helps to make the city a
better place in which to live. It is one of the features of the so-called
"progressive community."
Where there is a limit to the services that can or should be performed
and financed, then which shall it be? Organized groups interested in par-
ticular services will have a part in that decision. And, by exercising their
power of leadership in the formation of public policy, city officials can be
instrumental in the decision.
Statutory provisions requiring referendum approval prior to the under-
taking of some services and the levying of special taxes therefore have led
to a lack of progress in meeting certain problems. The Cities and Villages
Municipal Problems Commission in its first report pointed out that the
compulsory referendum provision of the permissive forestry tax had pre-
vented some cities from effectively meeting the Dutch elm problem. As
stated in the report, "Referenda have in general resulted in defeat of the
forestry tax proposal." The recommendation of the Commission that the
compulsory referendum approval be dropped was not approved at the 1959
session of the General Assembly. The fact that no municipality was suc-
cessful in levying a sales tax when approval by referendum was required is
indicative of how efTective such a requirement may be in preventing
services from being kept abreast of needs. A compulsory referendum pro-
vision is found in many Illinois statutes authorizing municipalities to provide
services.
New grants of power to render services will be needed as conditions
change. Granting power on the basis of population classification is fre-
quently used by the General Assembly. Where there is a reasonable rela-
tionship between the purpose of the statute and population, such classifica-
tion will be upheld against the attack that it constitutes special legislation.
In seeking further grants of power, it would be well to consider whether,
in addition to classification on the basis of population, cities and villages
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might be classified on the property tax base, on sales tax income, or on
some combination of these with population. A low classification here might
be taken as an indication of lack of ability to support the proposed service,
or a low classification might in some cases serve as indication of a needed
service.
Time changes, and with it the need of municipal services. Some services
may need to be transferred from the city to another unit of government,
such as the county (hospitals in smaller cities), or to a special district
(health, smoke abatement, etc.). And there may be some transfer of func-
tions from other units, especially from the township, to the city. The
question will be primarily one of the city taking on new services to meet
new needs as they arise.
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COUNTY AND TOWNSHIP FUNCTIONS IN ILLINOIS
IRVING HOWARDS
Historically, the county in Illinois, in common with counties throughout
the United States, has been considered an administrative extension of the
state. One of the more famous elaborations of this principle resulted from
the decision in the case of County of Cook v. City of Chicago,^ in which the
Illinois Supreme Court declared that county and township organizations
"are created in this State with a view to aid in carrying out the policy of
the State at large, for the administration of matters of political government,
finance, education, taxing, care of the poor, military organizations, means
of travel, and the administration of justice." The Illinois county, in line
with this dictum, does indeed perform basic functions for the state.
In accordance with the "administration of matters of political govern-
ment," the county plays an important part in the conduct of elections. The
county board lays out election districts, establishes polling places, and
performs the other procedural and technical aspects of elections.
In financial matters, the county is instrumental to the entire property
tax process. In the township county, assessments are made by the township
assessors, but correction of inequitable assessments is the responsibility of
the county treasurer, of the board of review, and, where one exists, of the
appointed supervisor of assessments. In the nontownship county, the county
treasurer acts as assessor in an ex officio capacity, and in one Illinois
county, St. Clair, an elected board of assessors has the basic responsibility
for assessing. The county also plays a crucial role in the computation of
property tax rates and preparation of assessment books. Everywhere except
where the township collector exists, the collection of taxes is fundamentally
the responsibility of the county treasurer in the township county and of the
sheriff in the commission county.
In the care of the poor, the Illinois county has an ever-increasing
responsibility— primarily as an administrative agency for the state. The
entire program of "public aid" is divided into general assistance and
categorical aid. General assistance most closely approximates the old poor-
relief program, while the categorical program includes old-age assistance,
aid to dependent -children, aid to the needy and blind, and aid to the
permanently and totally disabled. The general assistance program involves
'311 111. 234 (1924).
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state and local money; the categorical program involves federal as well as
state funds.
To administer these programs, each county has established a department
of public aid. For general assistance, the township must levy a qualifying
rate before the county department of public aid can receive money from the
state Public Aid Commission for distribution to the township supervisor.
The county board has the responsibility of levying the qualifying rate in
the commission county. If the qualifying rate is not levied in the township
county, the supervisor has the responsibility of distributing aid within his
township at his discretion. If it is not levied in the nontownship county,
the county board, through its appointed overseer of the poor, has a similar
responsibility.
In March, 1958, only 238 of the 1,456 governmental units in Illinois
with responsibilities for distributing general assistance levied the qualifying
rate. Of this number, only 82 local governments, including Chicago,
received state aid during that month. This, then, suggests that many of
the governmental units levying the qualifying tax refuse aid from the
Public Aid Commission in order to escape the accompanying regulations
and supervision.
Where categorical programs exist, the county department of public aid
acts as the sole administrative agency, distributing the money to the town-
ship supervisor (or the overseer of the poor in the commission counties)
according to rules detailed not only by the state Public Aid Commission,
but by the federal Social Security Administration as well.
The county's activity in the area of public health is certainly one of
the basic services performed by the county for the state, even though this
service is not mentioned specifically in the definitive case of County of Cook
V. City of Chicago. It has already been noted that single- or multiple-
county departments of public health, if approved by the voters, may be
established in the Illinois county. The state encourages the creation of
county health departments by providing that if a department meets stand-
ards set by the Department of Public Health, it will be subsidized in the
amount of one dollar for each raised locally or thirty cents per capita,
whichever is the lesser. Eighteen counties, in addition to their responsi-
bilities through the county health departments, have taken advantage of
statutory provisions to establish county tuberculosis sanitaria.
Highway construction and maintenance, which fall within the definition
of "means of travel" as outlined in County of Cook v. City of Chicago,
constitute another area where the county acts fundamentally for the state.
A superintendent of highways is appointed in each county, presumably with
the advice and consent of the Illinois Department of Public Works and
Buildings. The superintendent of highways has the responsibility of repair-
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ing, constructing, and maintaining roads and bridges within the county.
Historically, the Illinois county has had joint responsibility with the state
and the township (and the road district in the commission counties) to
provide highway facilities. Under the State Aid Law passed in 1913, the
state and the county shared equally the cost of constructing roads. Although
this law is no longer in effect, the county still receives financial aid from
the state in the form of 12 per cent of the motor fuel tax collected in down-
state counties and 1 1 per cent in Cook County. In addition to this, counties
under 500,000 population, after levying a qualifying rate, receive federal
monies through the Department of Public Works and Buildings for con-
struction and reconstruction of highways in the Federal Aid Secondary
System.
In the areas of education and the judicial processes, the Illinois county
also plays the role of administrative unit for state functions. Thus, part of
the state's attorney's salary is paid by the state, and the entire local court
structure spends much of its time expediting matters of state concern. The
county superintendent of schools is in a veiy large sense an agent of the
state superintendent of public instruction. For example, the county super-
intendent acts as adviser and assistant of teachers and school officers; is
responsible for improving the standards of teaching and the condition of
the common schools in his county; and supervises examinations prepared by
the state Teacher Certification Board for candidates applying for temporary
teaching permits.
Although it is true that the county in Illinois performs many basic
functions as an administrative unit of the state, it would be an error to
assume that the county performs no functions of a municipal character.
Even within the fabric of the state-local responsibilities of the county,
creation of tuberculosis sanitaria and county nursing homes suggests func-
tions performed primarily for the county's citizens. And certainly some of
the services offered in the areas of health, finance, highways, and judicial
administration are performed by the county as a governmental unit in its
own right. There are other areas, however, where the Illinois county more
clearly approximates a municipal corporation acting with only nominal
responsibilities to the state.
For example, in Illinois the county has some very specific responsibilities
in the area of planning and zoning. Under an act of 1935, as amended, a
county board may regulate the use of buildings, structures, and land and
may specify certain districts in order to implement its zoning edicts. Statu-
tory restrictions upon the zoning of agricultural land confine this authority
primarily to urban and semi-urban areas within the unincorporated portion
of the county. Under this statute, sixteen counties have adopted zoning
ordinances.
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As an elaboration of the county's basic responsibility for planning and
zoning, especially in urban areas, the statutes provide that counties may
join in a regional planning commission and advise the governmental units
therein on problems associated with the development of the region involved.
In 1957 the General Assembly extended the planning responsibility by
passing the Metropolitan Area Planning Act. Under this act, the counties
of Lake, Cook, Will, DuPage, Kane, and McHeniy joined to establish the
Northeastern Illinois Metropolitan Area Planning Commission. The Com-
mission acts in an advisory capacity in order to coordinate and guide the
proper development of water supply; storm water and sewage disposal;
integrated air, water, rail, and highway transportation; the orderly arrange-
ment of land for residential, commercial, industrial, and public improve-
ments; and local municipal and governmental services.
The obligation of the county in many of these areas is not new. The
county has had for some time general responsibilities to prescribe rules and
regulations governing streets, public grounds, water supply, sewage, and
similar matters within its unincorporated areas.
Financial responsibility of the county goes beyond the traditional area
of acting as the major agency for the property tax cycle or as the collection
unit for state motor fuel and retail occupation taxes. The county board
very definitely has obligations as the fiscal agency for the county, including
the power to prescribe the maximum fees which fee officers may retain for
personal salary and office hire. Accordingly, the board prepares a budget
outlining the county's functions and financial needs and then levies the
tax required to meets its financial obligations. The board may utilize a
county retail occupational tax along with the usual property tax for its
primary sources of local revenue.
In addition to the major municipal-type functions mentioned, the county
has many miscellaneous responsibilities which can legitimately be placed in
this category. Thus, the county may acquire and maintain airports; deter-
mine the kind and number of licenses which may be issued for establish-
ments selling liquor; control the number of transient lodgings, such as
trailers and motels; contract with any other governmental unit for the
disposal of garbage; purchase or lease a radio broadcasting station for police
or fire protection; own and operate historical museums; establish and
supervise parks, playgrounds, and other recreational facilities; and estab-
lish a county library system.
Structure of the County and Township
The effective carrying out of all these functions is made difficult by the
fantastic number of boards, commissions, officers, and employees existing
in county and township government. A brief summary of county structure
will give some idea of its complexity.
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Three possible county governing boards exist in Illinois: the three-
member board in the nontownship county; the supervisor-county board in
the township county; and the fifteen-member Cook County board. Along
with the county board, there exist several mandatory constitutional officers
within each county— county clerk, county treasurer, state's attorney,
sheriff, coroner, and county judge. These constitutional officers, along with
the county superintendent of schools, the county superintendent of high-
ways, and the recorder of deeds, form with the county board the nucleus
of what is generally understood to compose the county in Illinois. However,
present-day county government encompasses far more than this traditional
listing of specific offices.
In Illinois there are five possible county agencies or individuals which
have major responsibility in the area of assessing. (This listing does not
include the various boards of review which also have duties in this field.)
These include the county treasurer acting as assessor in the nontownship
county; the county treasurer acting as supervisor of assessments; the board
of assessors in counties of 150,000 to 500,000; the elected county assessor in
Cook County; and the appointed supervisor of assessments in the town-
ship and commission counties. It must be emphasized that this listing
ignores the township assessor, who is, without question, the most important
individual in this area in Illinois local government.
Illinois statutes provide for four possible tax-reviewing agencies and
two county agencies for collecting taxes. The county board acts as board
of review in the nontownship county; the three-member board of review,
consisting of the county chairman and two members appointed by the
county board, exists in the township county; counties between 150,000 and
500,000 have separate statutory authorization to establish a board of review;
and finally, a two-member board of appeals exists in Cook County. In regard
to county collection agencies, the county treasurer in township counties is
ex officio collector; in the nontownship counties the sheriff acts in the same
capacity. And these collection procedures make no mention of the town-
ship collectors who still operate in five Illinois counties.
Four distinct provisions exist in Illinois law for county auditing. Thus,
county boards in counties with a population of less than 75,000 may appoint
an auditor. In counties of 75,000 to 300,000 population, an auditor must
be elected. In Cook County an auditor is appointed by the county board,
while at the same time the county clerk, in an ex officio capacity, acts as
comptroller with specific auditing responsibilities.
In the area of judicial responsibilities, the situation is no less confusing.
Eleven separate judges or agencies can deal in a judicial process in which
the county has some interest. These include the county, probate, and
circuit judges; the clerk of the circuit court; the public defender; the
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superior judges elected in Cook County; the clerk of the superior court;
the clerk of the criminal court; the probate clerk; and finally, probation
officers and jury commissioners. This listing does not include a state's
attorney for each county and the justice of the peace, who is now a judicial
officer of the county.
Two statutory possibilities are available under which the county may
operate in the area of health. In the nontownship county, if there is no
board of health established under the sponsorship of the state Department
of Public Health, the board of commissioners acts as a board of health ex
officio. Where the citizens of the county vote to establish a county board of
health, such an agency is created, regardless of the form of county govern-
ment, under the express guidance of the Illinois Department of Public
Health. Multiple-county departments of public health are also possible.
In township counties which do not have a county board of health, each
township establishes a board of health consisting of the township supervisor,
clerk, and assessor.
The structure of the county is burdened further by the existence of nine
different boards (other than the county governing board and the boards
of review), ten miscellaneous agencies, and a judicial advisory council.
The boards include county boards of health for the nontownship county;
county boards of health established by vote of the county ; boards of directors
for county tuberculosis sanitaria; boai'ds of directors for soldiers' and
sailors' burial grounds; county boards of education; boards of zoning ap-
peals; retirement boards; county library boards; and county boards of
visitation. The miscellaneous agencies vary from the superintendents of
county homes to the cemetery trustees.
The governing body of the eighty-four township counties does nothing
to diminish this unusual governmental superstructure. In township counties
the board consists of a supervisor elected from each township without regard
to population. This supervisor not only serves on the county board, but
has responsibilities within the township which include being on the town
board and acting as treasurer for the township and as "overseer of the
poor." In addition to the regular township supervisors, assistant supervisors,
who have no township responsibilities, are also elected to serve on the
county board depending upon the population of the county. In counties
having a population of less than 90,000, each township with a population
of 4,000 or more is entitled to one assistant supervisor; the township gets an
additional assistant supervisor for each 2,500 population or fraction thereof.
Counties of 90,000 or more but of less than 150,000 are entitled to one
assistant supervisor whenever a township has a population of 5,000 or more
and to an additional assistant supervisor for each 5,000 population or
fraction thereof. Finally, counties having a population of 150,000 or more
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(except Cook) are entitled to one assistant supervisor whenever a township
has a population of 7,500 or more and to an additional assistant supervisor
for each 7,500 population or fraction thereof.
The inevitable result of this kind of representation is an inordinately
large board. In Illinois the board in township counties varies in size from
four to forty-nine members (based on the 1950 census). The median size
of the township county board is twenty-one. Twenty-four counties have
boards of thirty or more members.
Comparative County and Township Systems
The structure and functions of the county and township in Illinois are
bound, as we have seen, to the rigid theoretical base of subservience to
the state enunciated in County of Cook v. City of Chicago and implemented
by innumerable constitutional and statutory provisions. The end result is
an extremely complicated and delimited structure circumscribed to such an
extent that experimentation is difficult. An examination of what is occur-
ring in some other states will demonstrate this point.
In Illinois the township exists in essentially the same pattern in eighty-
four counties and in the unincorporated areas of Cook County, regardless
of the local needs of the area involved. The structure, in part because of
constitutional prescriptions and in part because of lethargy, has not changed
significantly since the present constitution was written. This is not so in
some of the other township states in the midwest.
Much of the experimentation associated with township structure and
functions has resulted in the outright diminishment of township powers.
Thus, in Michigan the township no longer has responsibilities over town-
ship roads, whereas in Minnesota more and more township roads are being
integrated into the county and state systems. In Ohio the importance of
the township as a unit of government has been greatly reduced— in 1913
appraisal of real estate was transferred to the county; in 1919 health ad-
ministration was taken over by general health districts; in 1925 personal
property tax assessment was transferred to the county; and recently the
justice of the peace courts were abolished.
Attempts have also been made to give the township government more
autonomy in the hope that this will result in township government more
suitably tailored to local conditions. Thus, Indiana permits the classifica-
tion of the township into ten categories based on population and valua-
tion, whereas Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota permit the township
to be organized as a corporate body.
The Illinois county, as we have seen, is an almost unbelievable, well-
nigh incomprehensible array of boards and officials, in large part the
result of excessive constitutional provisions and statutory mandates. The
county, attempting to perform within this complex not only the traditional
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functions, but an increasing number of municipal obligations, has had a
difficult time in Illinois. In view of practices in other states, as well as of
the experience in Illinois, a number of alternatives might be considered.
One of the obvious necessities is the reduction of the excessive con-
stitutional and legislative prescriptions throttling the county. This would
require a recognition that even though the county must continue to play
an ever increasing role as an administrative unit of the state, it must also
play an important part as a governmental unit meeting problems of a local
character. As developments throughout the United States indicate, once
this principle is accepted by the state and implemented by local county
officials, the number of possibilities for the county is almost endless.
For example, California, Maryland, Texas, Ohio, Washington, and
Missouri grant charter-making powers by constitutional provisions to all
or part of their counties. In addition, some states have permitted specific
counties to choose their o\vn governmental structure in order to meet prob-
lems of a local character. Dade County, Florida, is one of the more famous
examples of this policy. The charters adopted have frequently resulted in
county governments with more dramatic executive leadership and more
simplified structure than is the case normally.
Recognition that the county as a local governmental unit requires free-
dom to experiment need not result in the rather drastic changes which
usually accompany the installation of a completely new charter. In Illinois,
for example, we have noted the existence of a variety of elected officials
who assume ex officio responsibilities in other areas. This unofficial type of
office consolidation, if carried out in a more intensive fashion, as in Mich-
igan, might aid in simplification of county structure and result in better
performance of duties. Illinois also has had experience, albeit rather
limited, with functional consolidation. The most obvious example is the
operation of multiple-county health departments in Southern Illinois. In
Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Georgia, California, Nevada, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and Wisconsin, this policy is followed on a more extensive basis
for such functions as libraries, recreational facilities, airports, fire protec-
tion, water supply, sewage disposal, and drainage. Los Angeles County in
California has had an especially successful experience in arranging con-
tractual agreements with the various municipalities within its boundaries
to supply such basic services as police and fire protection as well as
sewage disposal and water. Such agreements can also be arranged between
counties.
In Illinois, classification of counties exists for certain purposes. As we
have seen, counties are divided into three categories for fee purposes, with
Cook County being in a class by itself; counties with a population of 15,000
or less may have a higher corporate rate by action of the county board than
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any other counties with the exception of Cook; counties with population of
125,000 or more must have a probate judge, whereas counties with a
population from 70,000 to 125,000 may if they wish; counties of over
35,000 population must have a public defender; and counties of 75,000 to
300,000 must elect a county auditor. Legislation pertaining to "counties of
over 500,000 population" is classic in Illinois, and legislation for other
urban counties is becoming more common. The constitution takes special
note of Cook County government, as we have seen, by prescribing that it
shall have a fifteen-member county board, with ten elected from Chicago
and five from the "towns outside of said city."
Classification examples, then, which by implication recognize that the
needs of the county vary, are numerous in Illinois. Illinois is joined in this
knowledge by the states of Indiana, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota.
A more complete awareness of this point, short of the adoption of special
legislation on an excessive basis, would allow clear-cut distinctions to be
made in the number of officials elected in and the duties required of counties
in various parts of the state.
Whatever policy is adopted will require a clear recognition that the
labyrinth of governmental structure and functions which have developed
through the territorial and constitutional period and which have been
implemented by statutory enactment, court decisions, and outright lethargy
makes difficult the effective operation of the traditional as well as the
newer corporate functions of the county. The preservation of the county
and, to a lesser extent, of the township in Illinois depends directly upon
a frank evaluation by state and local officials of the problems which emanate
from this complicated situation.
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